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1 
The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in the 
Supreme Court 
Tracey Maclin* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I suspect that many law students (and quite a few lawyers) find the Supreme 
Court’s consent search doctrine both straightforward and bewildering at the same 
time. The easy part is that the Court has stated that consent searches are 
permissible when a person “voluntarily” consents to the search. And whether a 
person’s consent is voluntary simply depends on all of the facts of the case. Thus, 
when judging whether police properly obtained a person’s consent to search, law 
students need not learn any multi-prong or multi-factored balancing tests. Nor, 
when examining a consent search scenario, must law students consider whether 
the police had probable cause or reasonable suspicion for their actions. Consent 
searches can go forward with no evidence of criminality. A hunch will do. And 
an officer’s reason for requesting consent—whether it be motivated by bias, or 
because he or she wanted to practice his or her technique at obtaining consent 
from motorists or bus passengers—does not undermine the validity of any 
consent given by a person. 
Similarly, law students need not worry that they have forgotten (or never 
learned) what the Framers thought about consent searches. I am sure that many 
law students are quite grateful that consent search cases have not triggered the 
Justices’ new-found concern that their holdings in Fourth Amendment cases be 
consistent with the Framers’ thinking about the amendment. Although the 
Court’s most recent consent search case, Georgia v. Randolph,1 prompted a little 
spat between Justices Stevens and Scalia over how the Framers would have 
settled the dispute in that case,2 none of the other Justices showed any inclination 
to seek out the Framers’ views on consent searches. Furthermore, prior to 
Randolph, none of the Justices, including Justices Scalia and Thomas, the Court’s 
strongest supporters of originalism in constitutional decision-making, have 
suggested that history matters when deciding whether a challenged consent 
search violates the Fourth Amendment. 
On the other hand, there is a surreal quality about the Court’s consent search 
jurisprudence.3 Professor Marcy Strauss nicely summarized the reaction of her 
 
*   Joseph Lipsitt Faculty Research Scholar and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. 
This article is the revised and expanded version of the Distinguished Speaker Series lecture that I gave at 
University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law on March 13, 2007. I want to thank Jill Hamers and Nicole 
Murray for their research assistance in the preparation of this article. 
1. 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
2. See id. at 123-25 (Stevens, J. concurring); id. at 142-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
3. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Souter nicely described this phenomenon when he stated there was “an 
air of unreality about the Court’s explanation that bus passengers consent to searches of their luggage to 
2007 / The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches 
 
2 
law students after reading a typical consent search case: “Every year, I witness 
the same mass incredulity. Why, one hundred criminal procedure students jointly 
wonder, would someone ‘voluntarily’ consent to allow a police officer to search 
the trunk of his car, knowing that massive amounts of cocaine are easily visible 
there?”4 I imagine that many law students indeed find it “absurd” that a person 
“voluntarily consented to a search when surrounded by police at close quarters, 
especially if the defendants knew (as they must have) that giving the consent 
would ultimately result in serious criminal charges being filed against them.”5 
Furthermore, law students understand what everyone else knows: a police 
“request” to search a bag or automobile is understood by most persons as a 
“command.” As the late H. Richard Uviller has described, a police request for 
consent, “however gently phrased, is likely to be taken by even the toughest 
citizen as a command. Refusal of requested ‘permission’ is thought by most of us 
to risk unpleasant, though unknown, consequences.”6 A majority of the Justices 
on the Supreme Court, however, reject this reality and continue to decide cases 
with the view that people have a genuine choice when police request consent to 
search. 
 
‘enhanc[e] their own safety and the safety of those around them.’” United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 208 
(2002) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
4. Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 211, 211 (2001). 
5. Ric Simmons, Not “Voluntary” but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for Understanding the 
Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 774 (2005). Cf. John M. Burkoff, Search Me?, 39 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 1109, 1114 (2007) (“How much of an idiot—how stupid, moronic, imbecilic—would a person carrying a 
gram of crack cocaine stashed in her underwear, for example, have to be to really consent—‘freely and 
voluntarily’—to being searched by a police officer, knowing full well that such a search would result inevitably 
in the discovery of the cocaine and a subsequent arrest?”); Daniel R. Williams, Misplaced Angst: Another Look 
at Consent-Search Jurisprudence, 82 IND. L.J. 69, 89 (2007) (“After all, what maddens us about the 
voluntariness locution in consent-search cases is precisely the unreality of it—most anyone would feel coerced 
by the sorts of police encounters that are described everyday in our courthouses.”); Christo Lassiter, Eliminating 
Consent from the Lexicon of Traffic Stop Interrogations, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 79, 128 (1998) (“It is inherently 
improbable that criminal suspects voluntarily would consent to the discovery of the very evidence necessary to 
seal their legal demise.”). 
6. H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 81 (1988). Professor Uviller was echoing what Professor 
Caleb Foote had recognized many years ago, namely, that “what on their face are merely words of request take 
on color from the officer’s uniform, badge, gun and demeanor.” Caleb Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle 
or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 402, 403 (1960). More recently, 
Illya Lichtenberg has reached similar conclusions regarding a police “request” for a consent search. According 
to Lichtenberg, “there tends to be agreement among most social scientists that when a police officer gives an 
order, command, or makes a request he expects compliance.”  See Illya D. Lichtenberg, Voluntary Consent or 
Obedience to Authority: An Inquiry Into the “Consensual” Police-Citizen Encounter 124 (Oct. 1999) (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Rutgers University) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). Lichtenberg also believes that:  
 [C]ertain inferences about police expectations from citizens, and citizen expectations from police are 
 reasonable. First, a request for consent to search cannot be significantly different from other police 
 requests. An asymmetrical power relationship in the police-citizen encounter appears to exist. Police 
 officers have all the power and may not hesitate to use coercive means, whether implied or explicit, to 
 maintain this assymetrical power relationship. A refusal to consent to a search is a clear challenge to the 
 officer and the officer may exert his power to achieve compliance. If the policeman did not want to 
 search, why would he have asked? 
Id. at 137-38. 
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Another bewildering aspect of the law of consent searches is exactly where 
such searches belong in the Court’s Fourth Amendment framework. “The precise 
basis for the consent doctrine has never been made explicit, and thus there is 
some dispute whether the consent doctrine is actually an exception to the warrant 
requirement.”7 Judges and academic commentators have proffered at least three 
different doctrinal foundations for consent searches.8 Traditionally, consent 
searches have been seen as an exception to the warrant and probable cause 
requirements. This is the approach taken in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the 
Court’s seminal consent search case.9 A second theory contends that a consent 
search, technically speaking, is not a “search” under the Fourth Amendment 
because the subject has relinquished his or her right to be protected by the 
amendment. Justice Thurgood Marshall appeared to endorse this view when he 
noted that “consent searches are permitted, not because such an exception to the 
requirements of probable cause and warrant is essential to proper law 
enforcement, but because we permit our citizens to choose whether or not they 
wish to exercise their constitutional rights.”10 Finally, a third view adopts the 
position that whether a challenged consent search is valid depends on whether the 
police conduct is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. Justice Scalia 
adopted this view in his opinion for the Court in Illinois v. Rodriguez, a third-
party consent search case.11 And this is also the position taken in United States v. 
 
7. Strauss, supra note 4, at 216 n.11; see also Thomas Y. Davies, Denying a Right by Disregarding 
Doctrine: How Illinois v. Rodriguez Demeans Consent, Trivializes Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, and 
Exaggerates the Excusability of Police Error, 59 TENN. L. REV. 1, 26 (1991) (“A number of early Supreme 
Court decisions treated consent intrusions as constitutional without explicitly spelling out a theory of consent.”). 
8. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 216 n.11 (listing three theories explaining the doctrinal basis for consent 
searches); see also George C. Thomas III, Terrorism, Race and a New Approach to Consent Searches, 73 MISS. 
L.J. 525, 544 (2003) (noting that the Court has offered the “waiver” and “reasonableness” theories, but “has 
settled on [reasonableness as the] justification for the consent search doctrine”). 
9. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (“It is . . . well settled that one of the 
specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is 
conducted pursuant to consent.” (citing Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); Zap v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946))). Interestingly, at the Court’s conference discussing Bustamonte, Justice 
Stewart, the author of Bustamonte, took the position that “[i]f there is consent, the Fourth Amendment does not 
apply at all.” THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940-1985) 456 (Del Dickson ed., 2001). Prior to 
Bustamonte, the Court’s early consent cases, including Davis, simply assumed that consent searches were valid 
and did not identify a doctrinal basis for consent searches. See infra notes 52-71 and accompanying text. 
10. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 283 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Davies, supra note 7, at 28. 
According to Professor Thomas Davies, 
[C]onsent amounts to a citizen’s surrender of an expectation of privacy and an exposure of an 
otherwise private interest. Under this concept, the sole focus of inquiry is whether a person whose 
privacy interest was at stake (a person with authority over the premises) actually gave permission  for 
an intrusion. If such a person gave consent, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard  is 
rendered inapplicable. If no such person gave consent, the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
apply in full. 
Id. at 28 (footnotes omitted). 
11. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990) (“What [the defendant] is assured by the Fourth 
Amendment itself, however, is not that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents; but 
that no such search will occur that is ‘unreasonable.’”); see also id. at 187 (“[W]hat is at issue when a claim of 
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Drayton, which held that bus passengers need not be informed of their right to 
refuse cooperation when police seek permission to search their bodies or 
luggage.12 
While courts and scholars have divergent views on the doctrinal basis for 
consent searches, there is no disagreement that police prefer consent searches to 
other types of investigative techniques. In fact, as Professors Joshua Dressler and 
Alan Michaels tell us in their popular treatise on criminal procedure, consent 
searches “are a dominant—perhaps the dominant—type of lawful warrantless 
search.”13 And many law professors share their view that “there are few areas of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of greater practical significance than consent 
searches.”14 But the police penchant to rely on consent searches raises another 
problem: the tension between, on the one hand, the police preference for and the 
Court’s zeal to approve consent searches,15 and, on the other hand, the Court’s 
 
apparent consent is raised is not whether the right to be free of searches has been waived, but whether the right 
to be free of unreasonable searches has been violated.”). In Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), like 
Rodriguez, another third-party consent case, Chief Justice Roberts seemed to endorse both the second and third 
doctrinal basis for consent searches. He stated that a “warrantless search is reasonable if police obtain the 
voluntary consent of a person authorized to give it. Co-occupants have ‘assumed the risk that one of their 
number might permit [a] common area to be searched.’” Id. at 128 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also id. at 137 
(“[T]he more reasonable approach is to adopt a rule acknowledging that shared living space entails a limited 
yielding of privacy to others, and that the law historically permits those to whom we have yielded our privacy to 
in turn cooperate with the government. Such a rule flows more naturally from our cases concerning Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness and is logically grounded in the concept of privacy underlying that Amendment.”). 
12. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206-07 (2002). In an interesting and provocative article, 
Professor Daniel Williams contends that “reasonableness” has been the focus of the Court’s analysis in consent 
cases since at least Bustamonte. Williams, supra note 5. Williams argues that despite statements to the contrary 
in its opinion, the Bustamonte Court never “actually embraced” the concept of voluntariness. See id. at 92-93. 
Metaphysical notions like voluntariness have always been mere lexical paraphernalia of the actual 
 inquiry into police methods we accept as legitimate crime-fighting tools. What happened in 
 Bustamonte and all of the other consent-search cases is what happened in Rodriguez: the Court 
 evaluated a civilian-police  encounter and inquired into whether the crime-fighting methodology was 
minimally acceptable. The  Court might dress up the analysis with evocative metaphysical notions, 
but only naiveté or the desire to erect a straw-man critique prevents one from seeing that the Court 
purports to do nothing more, and nothing less, than assess reasonableness.  
Id. (footnote omitted). 
13. 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 16.01, at 
261 (4th ed. 2006). Cf. Simmons, supra note 5, at 773 (“Over 90% of warrantless police searches are 
accomplished through the use of the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment.”); Burkoff, supra note 5, at 
1121 (noting that police are “quite open about” their willingness to pursue consent as a means of executing 
suspicionless searches). 
14.  DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 16.01, at 261. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 4, at 214; 
Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV.153, 209-10 
& n.193. 
15. Professor Wayne LaFave understates the Court’s attitude toward consent searches when he notes 
that “[t]he practice of making searches by consent is not a disfavored one.” 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8.1, at 5 (4th ed. 2004). Similarly, Professor Janice 
Nadler has commented that the Court’s attitude “appears to be that consent searches ought to be encouraged (or 
at least not discouraged) because they reinforce the rule of law.” Nadler, supra note 14, at 210. See also Morgan 
Cloud, Ignorance and Democracy, 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (2007) (“[C]ontemporary Fourth 
Amendment doctrine governing consent searches accepts—even encourages—ignorance among the people 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 39 
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commitment to the so-called warrant requirement. 
It is an understatement to say that law enforcement officials highly favor 
consent searches. A non-exhaustive list of the reasons for this preference would 
include the fact that consent searches are easy.16 In most jurisdictions, a request 
for consent need not be based upon any suspicion of criminal conduct. Also, 
consent searches do not entail the administrative hassles, time, and risks 
associated with obtaining and executing a judicial warrant. From a strategic 
standpoint, police view consent searches “as the ‘safest’ course of action in terms 
of minimizing the risk” of having criminal evidence excluded at a suppression 
hearing.17 Furthermore, a consent search may provide the police authority and 
discretion to conduct an open-ended search with virtually no limits. As Professor 
Wayne LaFave explains, a consent search has the “added benefit, at least when 
the consenting party does not carefully condition or qualify his consent, that the 
search pursuant to consent may often be of a somewhat broader scope than would 
be possible under a search warrant.”18 Finally, consent searches are popular 
because they allow police to exercise their discretion and power in contexts that 
affect literally hundreds of thousands of persons where the target is unlikely to 
say “no” to a request for a consent search. The fact that most persons subjected to 
consent searches are innocent of criminal conduct is constitutionally irrelevant.19 
 
about their constitutional rights.”). 
16. See, e.g., RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, L. PAUL SUTTON & CHARLOTTE A. CARTER, THE SEARCH 
WARRANT PROCESS 68-69 (1984) (“[L]istening to some law enforcement officers would lead to the conclusion 
that consent is the easiest thing in the world to obtain.”). See cf. id. at 19 (quoting a police detective saying: 
“‘Actually, there are a lot of warrants that are not sought because of the hassle. . . . I don’t think you can forgo a 
case because of the hassle of a search warrant, but you can . . . work some other method. If I can get consent [to 
search], I’m gonna do it.’” This detective suggested that as many as 98 percent of the searches were by 
consent.”). 
17. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 4-5; see also Strauss, supra note 4, at 259 (“[E]ven if the police 
have probable cause to search, and even if procuring a warrant would not be onerous, an officer may elect to 
obtain consent because it increases the likelihood that the search would be deemed valid.”). Cf. LAWRENCE P. 
TIFFANY, DONALD M. MCINTYRE, JR. & DANIEL L. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 159 (1967) (“In the 
routine case, police are likely to rely on the consent search to save the time and avoid the difficulty involved in 
going through the rather elaborate procedure required to obtain a search warrant.”). 
18. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 5. 
19. Cf. Strauss, supra note 4, at 214 (“Although precise figures detailing the number of searches 
conducted pursuant to consent are not—and probably can never be—available, there is no dispute that these 
type of searches affect tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of people every year. And recent 
decisions by the Supreme Court endorsing suspicionless drug interdictions and pretextual automobile stops will 
only magnify the problem.” (footnotes omitted)); Nadler, supra note 14, at 209 (“[T]he small amount of 
scattered evidence that exists suggests that the absolute number of consent searches is quite high, as is the 
proportion of consent searches of all searches conducted.”). Professor Nadler also notes that “[t]he vast majority 
of people subjected to consent searches are innocent.” Id. at 210. A recently released federal study, based on 
interviews conducted by the Census Bureau of persons who had contact with the police, found that “[m]ore than 
half (57.6%) of all searches conducted [by the police during traffic stops] in 2005 were by consent.”  MATTHEW 
R. DUROSE, ERICA L. SMITH & PATRICK A. LANGAN, U.S. DEP’T JUST., CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE 
PUBLIC, 2005, at 6 (2007), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpp05.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). The study found that in “11.6% of searches conducted during a traffic stop in 2005, police found 
drugs, an illegal weapon, open containers of alcohol, or other illegal items.” Id. at 7.  
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This aspect of consent searches is most pronounced when police request consent 
from motorists during routine traffic stops or from passengers traveling on 
interstate buses and trains.20 Motorists stopped for traffic offenses and passengers 
on interstate buses and trains are the classic examples of a “captured audience.” 
The last reason explaining why police prefer consent searches highlights the 
tension between consent searches and the warrant requirement. The warrant 
requirement was designed primarily to interpose a neutral magistrate’s judgment 
between the law enforcement officer zealously ferreting out crime and the 
privacy and personal security of individual citizens.21 During the heyday of the 
warrant requirement, the Court repeatedly insisted “that searches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few 
specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.”22 To be sure, even the 
Warren Court, and later the Burger Court, was willing to recognize that consent 
searches were an exception to the warrant requirement. But the justifications 
announced for consent searches in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte23 were neither 
convincing nor compelling. Moreover, those justifications undermine the 
rationale behind the warrant requirement. 
Justice Stewart’s opinion for the Court in Bustamonte ruled that police must 
be permitted to pursue consent searches, even without informing a person of his 
right to refuse a consent search and without any showing that the person had 
knowledge of his right to deny consent.24 The Court insisted that there was a 
“legitimate [societal] need for [consent] searches” and that in certain cases a 
consent search “may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable 
evidence.”25 Justice Stewart’s premise that society has a legitimate need for 
consent searches—while holding “at least surface appeal”26—certainly proves 
very little for Fourth Amendment purposes. As Stewart recognized in many other 
search and seizure cases: 
[T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can 
never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. The 
investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were 
 
20. Nadler, supra note 14, at 209-10 & n.193 (“There is no reliable estimate for the number of consent 
searches conducted in any given year nationwide (or even statewide). In some cases, police officers have 
testified that they ask for consent to search every motorist they stop. In one city, it was estimated anecdotally 
that 98% of the searches were consent searches.”) (citations omitted). 
21. See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 
464 (1932). 
22. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (footnote omitted). 
23. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
24. Id. at 227-34, 248-49. 
25. Id. at 227. 
26. Strauss, supra note 4, at 260 (“[E]ven in the absence of empirical evidence, the argument [that law 
enforcement interests are advanced by consent searches] holds at least surface appeal.”). 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 39 
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unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who 
wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person’s home and property 
may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in 
enforcement of the criminal law.27 
Justice Stewart’s related concern, that in certain cases a consent search may 
be the “only” means to obtain criminal evidence, was a naked assumption 
without empirical support.28 Today, there is anecdotal as well as empirical 
evidence suggesting that consent searches are not particularly effective,29 and as 
a political matter, the popularity of consent searches seems to be declining.30 
 
27. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978) (citation omitted). 
28. See Daniel L. Rotenberg, An Essay On Consent(less) Police Searches, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 175, 190 
(1991) (criticizing Justice Stewart’s analysis on this point, and noting that “[a]necdotal evidence and a brief 
survey of several police departments suggest that the consent search tactic is used innovatively, extensively, 
occasionally, or perhaps not all”); Strauss, supra note 4, at 260-61 (noting that Stewart’s arguments supporting 
the police need for consent searches have not been “empirically validated,” and explaining that “there is strong 
reason to believe that crime control would not unduly suffer were the police no longer able to obtain consent to 
search.”); LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.1, at 12 (questioning Justice Stewart’s premise that there is a compelling 
need for consent searches: “It is to be strongly doubted . . . whether this is the case.”). 
29. For example, a report from the New Jersey Attorney General’s Office concluded that “most consent 
searches [conducted by state troopers] do not result in a positive finding” of criminal activity, even with a 
requirement that there be reasonable suspicion of criminality before requesting permission to search. RONALD 
SUSSWEIN ET AL., N.J. OFF. ATT’Y GEN., INTERIM REPORT OF THE STATE POLICE REVIEW TEAM REGARDING 
ALLEGATIONS OF RACIAL PROFILING 28 (1999), http://www.state.nj.us/lps/intm_419.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). The report further explained that the “positive” findings disclosed by state police 
empirical data concerning consent searches were “somewhat misleading, since a positive result is recorded if 
the search led to any arrest or seizure of contraband without considering the seriousness of the charge or the 
type, quantity, or value of contraband that was discovered. Based upon anecdotal reports, most arrests are for 
less serious offenses, and major seizures of significant drug shipments are correspondingly rare.” Id. at 36-37. 
Finally, this report also found “that minority motorists were disproportionately subject to consent searches.” Id. 
at 30. This negative view of consent searches was reaffirmed by Dr. James J. Fyfe, a criminal justice professor 
and former New York City police lieutenant. Dr. Fyfe testified to the New Jersey Senate Judiciary Committee 
that 
consent searches should be ended, because they pose a real threat to Fourth Amendment rights and 
because they are not an efficient law enforcement tool. He said consent searches were always 
suspect . . . . He said waivers of the Fourth Amendment are valid only when they are made 
voluntarily and intelligently, and police managers should be skeptical of police officers who say they 
found drugs in a motorist’s trunk after they were given consent to search. He believed far more 
credible are the accounts of individuals who were subject to consent searches and who said they did 
not know they could refuse the search and were told that if they did not consent, they would be 
detained while the trooper obtained a warrant[.] 
REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE’S INVESTIGATION OF RACIAL PROFILING AND THE 
NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE 79 (2001), http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/RacialProfiling/sjufinal.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
30. Public opposition to consent searches has typically arisen as part of a political movement against 
police racial profiling of motorists. See Note, The Fourth Amendment and Antidilution: Confronting the 
Overlooked Function of the Consent Search Doctrine, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2187, 2187-88 (2006) [hereinafter 
The Fourth Amendment and Antidilution] (“Hawaii, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Rhode Island banned the use 
of consent searches ‘after controversies about racial profiling,’ and the California Highway Patrol voluntarily 
adopted a policy prohibiting its officers from requesting consent searches from motorists.” (footnote omitted)); 
Scott Henson, “Strange Coalition” Backs Consent Search Ban, Apr. 13, 2005, 
2007 / The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches 
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Concededly, Justice Stewart did not hide the policy choices that motivated his 
decision to allow consent searches, and reasonable persons can disagree over his 
hardheaded concerns about the need for consent searches. But, as Professors 
Dressler and Michaels correctly observe, Justice Stewart’s “pragmatic 
explanation” justifying consent searches, “although candid, is conceptually weak 
if there really is a constitutional warrant requirement.”31 
From the perspective of the individual, a major problem with consent 
searches as authorized in Bustamonte is that police are given unfettered 
discretion to pursue consent without informing an individual of his right to say 
no and telling the individual that refusal will be respected by the police. Another 
significant problem with consent searches is that in the typical case, where the 
police seek consent from a motorist stopped for a traffic violation or from a 
passenger sitting on a bus, the confrontation between the police and the citizen is 
not an “arm’s length” encounter. These factors are relevant to Fourth 
Amendment analysis because the amendment is concerned with checking police 
discretionary power. The Court once explained that “[s]ecurity against unlawful 
searches is more likely to be attained by resort to search warrants than by reliance 
upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers while acting under the excitement 
that attends the capture of persons accused of crime.”32 If that statement remains 
accurate, consent searches, as currently executed by most police officers, threaten 
the security protected by the Fourth Amendment. If, as the Court has said on 
numerous occasions, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and the warrant 
requirement is to establish a judicial framework, rather than an officer-in-the-
field process, for deciding “[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to 
the right of search,”33 then consent searches, as currently practiced in much of the 
 
http://gritsforbreakfast.blogspot.com/2005/04/strange-coalition-backs-consent-search.html (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (describing coalition between the American Civil Liberties Union and the National 
Rifle Association in supporting a ban on consent searches in Texas during traffic stops). A group of public 
interest organizations in Texas subsequently produced reports calling for a ban on consent searches during 
traffic stops. See, e.g., DWIGHT STEWARD & MOLLY TOTMAN, DON’T MIND IF I TAKE A LOOK, DO YA?: AN 
EXAMINATION OF CONSENT SEARCHES AND CONTRABAND HIT RATES AT TEXAS TRAFFIC STOPS (2005), 
http://www.criminaljusticecoalition.org/files/userfiles/racial_profiling/racial_profiling_ report_2005.pdf (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review). The report, relying on statistics generated by Texas law enforcement 
agencies, found that “2 out of 3 law enforcement agencies reported consent searching Blacks or Latinos at 
higher rates than Anglos following a traffic stop,” and that the “contraband hit rates from consent searches does 
not indicate that these searches are proving fruitful,” suggesting that “consent searches not only yield high racial 
disparities, but that they are likely an ineffective and inefficient use of law enforcement resources.” Id. at 7.  
31. DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 13, § 16.01, at 262. 
32. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). 
33. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“When the right of privacy must 
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or 
government enforcement agent.”). As Justice Douglas has explained, authorizing police to proceed with consent 
searches “circumvent[s]” the warrant requirement in three ways: 
First, [police] avoid submitting to a magistrate’s independent assessment of probable cause. Second, 
[police] are spared the necessity of making a record, in the form of an affidavit sworn prior to the 
search, that guards against the possibility that an ex post facto justification will be based upon what 
the search turns up. Finally, to the extent the police use . . . a boilerplate consent form, they are 
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nation, seem at odds with the purpose of the warrant requirement. 
Section II of this article describes how the law of consent searches developed 
before Bustamonte was decided. Section III focuses on Bustamonte. Specifically, 
this section analyzes the emergence of Bustamonte’s “voluntariness” test for 
judging the validity of consent searches, highlights the spoken and unspoken 
premises that influenced the result in Bustamonte, and outlines Bustamonte’s 
continuing relevance in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. Section IV of the 
article examines United States v. Drayton and explains why a cryptic passage in 
that opinion provides important clues on the Court’s current understanding of 
consent under the Fourth Amendment. Section V discusses Georgia v. Randolph 
and the “good” news about consent searches—both explicit and implicit—
inherent in the majority opinion. Finally, Section VI comments on how the tacit 
concerns that explain the result in Randolph can be applied in future consent 
search cases. 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF CONSENT SEARCHES 
As I hope to demonstrate, the Court’s recent ruling in Georgia v. Randolph34 
may signal an important change in the Court’s consent search jurisprudence and 
has the potential to alter the way the Justices approach future consent search 
cases. To be sure, it will be possible to confine Randolph—a case involving 
third-party consent—to its unique facts in future cases. Thus, one can be 
understandably skeptical about Randolph’s potential to revise the Court’s view of 
consent in traffic stop or bus interdiction cases. But Bustamonte itself shows that 
consent search cases are not decided in a doctrinal vacuum. Bustamonte rejected 
a “waiver” model for measuring the validity of a consent search in the traffic stop 
context, in part, because such an approach was “thoroughly inconsistent” with 
the Court’s earlier decisions approving third-party consent searches in very 
different contexts.35 Thus, while the facts of third-party consent cases and traffic 
stop consent cases often differ dramatically, doctrinal concerns in one category of 
cases can sometimes affect another category of cases.36 But before explaining 
why Randolph may signal a change in the way the Court approaches consent 
searches, it is important to understand how the law of consent searches has 
 
relieved of the particularity requirement of the warrant. 
Gentile v. United States, 419 U.S. 979, 982 (1974) (memorandum disposition denying certiorari) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
34. 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
35. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 245-46 (1973). 
36. Williams, supra note 5, at 73 n.16 (“Although third-party consent-search cases are relatively rare, 
they are doctrinally significant because of how their existence shapes the consent-search analysis.”). Cf. Peter 
Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy, and the Meaning of “Searches” in the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 319, 326 (1984) (noting the overlap in the Court’s Fourth Amendment cases where 
“the concept of expectation of privacy—and its constitutent [sic] element assumption of risk—may be used in 
one case to determine whether a search occurred, and in another case to determine whether there was consent”). 
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evolved to its current status. 
A. Early Explanations of Why Consent Searches are Reasonable 
The Court’s initial explanations reconciling consent searches with the Fourth 
Amendment were tentative and, at times, murky.37 Indeed, in Amos v. United 
States,38 which is sometimes cited as one of the Court’s first cases raising issues 
of consent under the Fourth Amendment,39 the Court never used the term 
“consent” in its opinion. In Amos, federal officers arrived at the home of the 
defendant where they were met by his wife.40 They informed the wife that they 
were federal officers and had come to search the premises for violations of the 
revenue laws.41 The officers had no warrant.42 The wife provided the officers 
access to the home and a “store” that was located within the curtilage of the 
home.43 The search revealed illegal whiskey.44 
The Court held that the search violated Amos’ Fourth Amendment rights 
because the officers lacked a warrant.45 Apart from any issue of consent, the 
Court ruled that the failure to obtain a warrant made the search unreasonable.46 In 
 
37. Cf. Davies, supra note 7, at 26 (noting that early Court rulings did not expressly spell out a theory of 
consent and that some “pre-Burger Court decisions that did explain consent typically described it as a waiver”). 
38. 255 U.S. 313 (1921). 
39. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 8, at 545 (noting that the Court’s first rulings regarding consent 
searches “assumed that waiver” was the proper standard for measuring consent, and citing to Amos as “the 
earliest of the Court’s Fourth Amendment cases raising ‘consent’”). Amos was decided on the same day that the 
Court decided Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). In Gouled, a government informant, who was a 
friend of Gouled, went to Gouled’s office to gather information about an alleged conspiracy to defraud the 
government. Id. at 304. The informant, “pretending to make a friendly call,” obtained admission to Gouled’s 
office and “in [Gouled’s] absence, without warrant of any character, seized and carried away several 
documents,” one of which was later admitted at Gouled’s prosecution for fraud. Id. The Court upheld Gouled’s 
Fourth Amendment claim. See id. at 305-06. Although the government argued that Gouled had consented to the 
informant’s entry, the Court did not address that issue. Instead, the Court focused on the “search and seizure 
subsequently and secretly made in [Gouled’s] absence.” Id. at 306. For a more detailed explanation on Gouled 
and its impact on covert intrusions by government informants and spies, see Tracey Maclin, Informants and the 
Fourth Amendment, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 573 (1996). 
40. Amos, 255 U.S. at 315. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 314-15. 
44. Id. at 315. 
45. Id. at 315-17. 
46. Amos, 255 U.S. at 315-16. The Court explained that its holding in Gouled dictated this result. Id. at 
316. Gouled ruled that warrantless searches were unreasonable. See Gouled, 255 U.S. at 308 (“Searches and 
seizures are as constitutional under the Amendment when made under valid search warrants as they are 
unconstitutional, because unreasonable, when made without them,—the permission of the Amendment has the 
same constitutional warrant as the prohibition has, and the definition of the former restrains the scope of the 
latter.”); see also Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and 
Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 592 (1996) (explaining that Gouled required, as a 
threshold matter, that a search or seizure of a home or office satisfy the procedural safeguards contained in the 
Warrant Clause: “Searches and seizures conducted pursuant to warrants satisfying the requirements of probable 
cause, particularity, and an oath, were defined as not unreasonable, and therefore not unconstitutional. The 
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one short paragraph, the Court summarily rejected the government’s contention 
that Amos’ rights had been “waived” when his wife gave the agents access to the 
home.47 While the Court left open the question “whether it is possible for a wife, 
in the absence of her husband, . . . to waive his constitutional rights,” there was 
no need to address that issue in Amos because it was “perfectly clear that under 
the implied coercion here presented, no such waiver was intended or effected.”48 
The holding in Amos rested on the principle that warrantless searches were 
unreasonable searches. The Court’s brief response to the government’s argument 
suggested, but did not definitively determine, that the Court was inclined to view 
consent as requiring an intentional waiver of one’s right.49 Importantly, however, 
Amos followed the principle, dating back to at least 1914 when the Court decided 
Weeks v. United States,50 that warrantless searches by government officers 
violated the Fourth Amendment.51 
The Court’s next important discussion of consent occurred twenty-five years 
after Amos was decided. In 1946, the Court decided Davis v. United States52 and 
planted the seeds for the “voluntariness” test that would eventually be embraced 
in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. Davis was the owner of a gasoline station and was 
suspected of dealing in black market gasoline.53 After purchasing gas without the 
necessary gasoline ration stamps, federal agents arrested an attendant, and then 
arrested Davis when he returned to the station.54 While questioning Davis, the 
agents demanded access to a locked room where Davis kept his records.55 Davis, 
at first, refused access to the room but eventually relented, according to his 
testimony, “because the agents threatened to break down the door if he did not.”56 
After Davis opened the door, he gave the agents gasoline coupons that had been 
 
absence of a valid warrant, however, meant that a search or seizure was both unreasonable and 
unconstitutional.”). 
47. Amos, 255 U.S. at 317. 
48.    Id.  
49. See Thomas, supra note 8, at 545 (“It is impossible to read this paragraph [in Amos] as based on a 
theory other than waiver.”). 
50. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
51. See id. at 393 (stating that federal law enforcement officers “could only have invaded the house of 
the accused when armed with a warrant issued as required by the Constitution”); see also Cloud supra note 46, 
at 590 (explaining that in the early part of the twentieth century the Court took the view that: 
Searches and seizures of property thus were subject to both procedural and substantive limitations. 
All intrusions had to satisfy the procedural rules. The substantive restrictions, however, established a 
hierarchical order based upon the nature of the property. Private papers sat at the top, immune from 
seizure unless they were stolen, contraband, or criminal instrumentalities. Property fitting into one of 
those categories lay at the bottom of the substantive hierarchy. Government  could seize these items 
because it had a recognized property or possessory interest in them. And no matter where property 
fell in this pecking order, its physical location was relevant.) 
52. 328 U.S. 582 (1946). 
53. Id. at 585 
54. Id.  
55. Id. at 586. 
56. Id.  
2007 / The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches 
 
12 
stored in a filing cabinet.57 These coupons were used to convict him at trial.58 
The agents, not surprisingly, offered a different version of the facts. One 
agent testified that he told Davis that he would have to open the door to the 
locked room.59 The agent denied, however, threatening to break open the door.60 
While questioning continued between Davis and the agents, Davis observed 
another agent attempting to gain access to the locked room.61 According to one of 
the agents, Davis then said, “He don’t need to do that. I will open the damned 
door.”62 The district court credited the agents’ version of the facts and found that 
Davis “had consented to the search and seizure and that his consent was 
voluntary.”63 The Court of Appeals affirmed Davis’ conviction but did not 
address and expressed some doubt regarding the district court’s ruling that Davis’ 
consent to the search was “voluntary.”64 
In an opinion that many today might find startling in light of its author, 
Justice Douglas ruled that the agents had not violated Davis’ Fourth Amendment 
rights.65 Justice Douglas began by noting that the Court’s prior cases defining the 
scope of “reasonable” searches and seizures were not controlling because they 
dealt with the seizure of private papers.66 The search of Davis’ office involved 
“gasoline ration coupons which never became the private property of the holder 
but remained at all times the property of the Government and subject to 
inspection and recall by it.”67 Justice Douglas explained that where government 
officers seek to inspect “public documents at the place of business where they are 
required to be kept, permissible limits of persuasion are not so narrow as where 
private papers are sought.”68 When someone doing business with the 
 
57. Id.  
58. See id. at 587. 
59. Id. at 586. 
60. Id.  
61. Id. at 586-87. 
62. Id.  
63. Id. at 587. 
64. Id. Specifically, the Court of Appeals observed that “Davis must have known, under arrest as he was, 
that the officers were not likely to stand very long upon ceremony, but in one way or another, would enter the 
office.” United States v. Davis, 151 F.2d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 1945).  
65. See id. at 593-94. According to one biographer of Douglas, in 1946, “Douglas was no civil 
libertarian” in the view of his fellow Justices. BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 236 (2003).   
66.  See Davis, 582 U.S. at 587-88..   
67. Davis, 328 U.S. at 588. Justice Douglas relied upon Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911), 
for the principle that the Fourth Amendment recognizes a distinction between the seizure of private papers or 
documents and public property in the custody of a citizen. Davis, 328 U.S. at 589. Wilson, however, concerned 
whether a corporate officer, who held corporate documents, could resist a subpoena duces tecum issued to a 
corporation on the grounds that producing the documents would incriminate him. See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 367-
71. The Wilson Court rejected the officer’s Fifth Amendment claim. See Wilson, 221 U.S. at 377-86. Wilson’s 
discussion of the Fourth Amendment was limited to explaining that the subpoena “was definite and reasonable 
in its requirements, and it was not open to the objection” that it was overbroad or unreasonable in its demand for 
documents. Id. at 376. There was no discussion of the concept of consent in Wilson. 
68. Davis, 328 U.S. at 593. 
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government, as was Davis, “is persuaded by argument that it is his duty to 
surrender [public documents] and he hands them over, duress and coercion will 
not be so readily implied as where private papers are involved.”69 Douglas also 
noted that because the search and seizure occurred in a business location, rather 
than a home, “[t]he strict test of consent, designed to protect an accused against 
production of incriminating evidence, has no place here.”70 Ultimately, Justice 
Douglas concluded that, “as a matter of law,” the district court’s finding that 
Davis had consented to the search and seizure of the coupons was not 
“erroneous.”71 
Justice Douglas’ opinion in Davis is noteworthy on several counts.72 The 
most remarkable aspect of his opinion, however, is its departure from precedent 
concerning the reasonableness of warrantless searches of homes and offices. 
Davis makes almost no effort to reconcile the concept of consent with the 
principle that warrantless searches were unreasonable and at odds with the 
underlying of the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. As already noted, during 
the early part of the twentieth century, the Court considered warrantless searches 
of homes and offices unreasonable searches.73 By the time that Davis was 
decided, the Court and individual Justices had issued several opinions outlining 
the purpose behind the amendment. Foremost among those opinions were Weeks 
v. United States74 and Justice Brandeis’ dissent in Olmstead v. United States,75 
 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Justice Douglas’ opinion should make one pause because of its many omissions. For example, not 
only does Douglas not define the meaning of consent, he never explains what he meant by the phrase the “strict 
test of consent,” id., a standard that he concludes is not applicable to the search of Davis’ store. Similarly, 
Douglas does not explain why government officers are given greater leeway to use duress and coercion when 
seeking public documents. See id. Nor does he explain why consent is a narrower concept when governmental 
agents seek consent to search a business, rather than a home. Justice Douglas also does not explain why the 
concept of consent under the Fourth Amendment is tied to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. See id. (“The custodian in this situation is not protected against the production of incriminating 
documents. The strict test of consent, designed to protect an accused against production of incriminating 
evidence, has no place here.”). As Justice Frankfurter notes in his dissent in Davis, the majority “derives 
voluntariness from the fact that what the officers compelled Davis to give up were ration coupons.” Id. at 600 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). As Frankfurter correctly notes, the majority’s understanding of voluntariness is at 
odds with the common understanding of that term. See id. (“[T]he law has always meant by ‘voluntary’ what 
everybody else means by it.”). Surely, the Court of Appeals had the better argument when they expressed doubt 
regarding the district court’s finding that Davis had voluntarily consent to the search of the locked room: “Davis 
must have known, under arrest as he was, that the officers were not likely to stand very long upon ceremony, 
but in one way or another, would enter the office.” United States v. Davis, 151 F.2d 140, 142 (2d. 1945). 
Finally, Justice Douglas never explains why the legal concept of “voluntariness” in this context turns on “the 
nature of the quest, instead of on the nature of the response of the person in control of the sought documents.” 
Davis, 328 U.S. at 600 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
73. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
74. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Professor Morgan Cloud has explained that although Weeks is better known 
among modern lawyers and scholars as the leading case adopting the exclusionary rule for federal cases, Weeks 
also established a significant “building block to the interpretative theory emphasizing the Warrant Clause” as 
the touchstone for determining the constitutionality of governmental searches and seizures. Cloud, supra note 
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which provided a theoretical foundation for a broad construction of the 
amendment as a bulwark against unjustified governmental intrusions. Brandeis 
famously noted that the Fourth Amendment conferred a “right to be let alone” 
from governmental intrusions upon the “privacy of the individual.”76 Brandeis 
also noted,  
[u]njustified search and seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, 
whatever the character of the paper; whether the paper when taken by the 
federal officers was in the home, in an office or elsewhere; whether the 
taking was effected by force, by fraud, or in the orderly process of a 
court’s procedure.77  
The Court’s other opinions preceding Davis also explain why warrantless 
searches were inconsistent with amendment’s purpose. In Weeks v. United States 
the Court explained that the Fourth Amendment was designed to put law 
enforcement officers “under limitations and restraints as to the exercise of [their] 
power and authority,” especially in light of “[t]he tendency of those who execute 
the criminal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful 
seizures.”78 To promote this goal, warrantless searches of homes and offices were 
disfavored. Accordingly,  in United States v. Lefkowitz the Court stated—
fourteen years before Davis was decided—that “the informed and deliberate 
determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants as to what searches 
and seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be preferred over the 
hurried action of officers and others who may happen to make arrests.”79 
Justice Douglas’ opinion in Davis never explains why consent searches in 
general, or the specific search of Davis’ office, which Douglas concedes did not 
satisfy the “strict test of consent,”80 were consistent with underlying purpose of 
the Fourth Amendment. Nor does Justice Douglas attempt to reconcile his ruling 
that the warrantless search of Davis’ office was constitutional with the 
established principle that warrantless searches of homes and offices are 
constitutionally unreasonable.81 These omissions are even more troubling after 
 
46, at 587. 
75. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
76. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
77. Id. at 477-78 (footnotes omitted). 
78. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392. 
79. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). 
80. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593 (1946). 
81. When Davis was decided, there was no dispute that business offices were protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. See, e.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 
251 U.S. 385 (1920); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (“[W]e do not wish to be understood as holding 
that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the Fourth Amendment, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In a companion case to Davis, Zap v. United States, 
328 U.S. 624 (1946), also authored by Justice Douglas, the Court upheld a warrantless examination of Zap’s 
business records and a warrantless seizure of a check that was used to convict Zap of defrauding the 
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reading Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Davis. As Frankfurter observed, if the 
point of having judges issue warrants is to confine the scope of the subsequent 
search, “[i]t cannot be that the Constitution meant to make it legally 
advantageous not to have a warrant, so that the police may roam freely and have 
the courts retrospectively hold that the search that was made was ‘reasonable,’ 
reasonableness being judged from the point of view of obtaining relevant 
evidence.”82 Such a discretionary and unsupervised police intrusion “was 
precisely what the Fourth Amendment was meant to stop.”83 
B. The Rationale of Third-Party Consent Searches 
Davis marked the Court’s first tentative steps to explain why consent 
searches were consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Another important phase 
in the development of the law of consent searches is the Court’s treatment of 
third-party consent searches during the time period between Davis and the 
landmark ruling in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. As was the case in Davis, the 
constitutional theory supporting third-party consent searches is not obvious from 
the opinions of the Court.84 While detailed analysis is not forthcoming from the 
Court, the Court’s silence on one point is significant and revealing. In the third- 
party consent cases, the Court does not announce a per se rule barring third-party 
consent searches. Such a rule could have been defended on the basis that such 
searches do not involve exigent circumstances excusing the procuring of a 
warrant. More importantly, a per se ban on third-party consent searches was 
supported by several precedents in the early part of the twentieth century in 
which the Court held that warrantless searches of homes and offices were 
unreasonable searches. Finally, a prohibition on third-party consent searches 
 
government related to a contract with the Navy Department, notwithstanding Zap’s protest against this 
intrusion. In Zap, Justice Douglas relied on Davis for the proposition that the law of searches and seizures “is 
the product of the interplay of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.” Zap, 328 U.S. at 628. He explained that 
“those rights may be waived,” and that Zap, “in order to obtain the Government’s business, specifically agreed 
to permit inspection of his accounts and records, he voluntarily waived such claim to privacy which he 
otherwise might have had as respects business documents related to those contracts.” Id. While Justice Douglas 
conceded Zap’s contract with the Navy Department did not authorize the seizure of the check, he nonetheless 
found that “[t]hough consent to the inspection did not include consent to the taking of the check, there was no 
wrongdoing in the method by which the incriminating evidence was obtained.” Id. at 630. 
82. Davis, 328 U.S. at 595 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
83. Id. 
84. See LAFAVE, supra note 15, §  8.3(a), at 143 (“In the relatively few third party consent cases which 
have reached the Court, the theoretical underpinnings of such consent have not been the subject of close or 
detailed analysis.”). In one of the first cases to address the merits of a third-party consent search, Chapman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961), Justice Frankfurter remarked that “[t]he course of true law pertaining to 
searches and seizures, as enunciated here, has not—to put it mildly—run smooth.” Id. at 618 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). He further noted that the Chapman opinion “is hardly calculated . . . to contribute clarification.” Id. 
Justice Clark’s dissent provided stronger criticism. He observed that the Court’s search and seizure doctrine 
“[f]or some years now . . . has been muddy, but today the Court makes it a quagmire.” Id. at 622 (Clark, J., 
dissenting). 
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would have been arguably more in line with the Framers’ underlying purposes 
for the amendment, which was to control discretionary searches by law 
enforcement officers. Somewhat ironically, Justice Douglas, the author of Davis, 
would subsequently adopt this position notwithstanding his opinion in Davis. But 
by the time that Justice Douglas had come to this view in 1974, the requirements 
of the Warrant Clause had ceased to have any application to consent searches. 
Chapman v. United States85 was one of the first cases to address the merits of 
a third-party consent search. In Chapman, the defendant’s landlord told the 
police to enter the defendant’s home when the landlord and the police detected a 
“strong odor of ‘whiskey mash’ coming from the house.”86 After entering, the 
police found “a complete and sizable distillery and 1,300 gallons of mash located 
in the living room.”87 The government later argued that the landlord’s authority 
justified the warrantless search, but the Court rejected that claim.88 The Court 
emphasized, inter alia, that acceptance of this argument would reduce the Fourth 
Amendment “to a nullity” and leave tenants’ Fourth Amendment rights “secure 
only in the discretion of [landlords].”89 While Chapman was somewhat vague 
about the basis for its holding, perhaps purposefully so,90 in Stoner v. Calfornia,91 
the Court appeared to provide some clarity regarding third-party consent 
searches. Stoner involved a search of the defendant’s hotel room after a hotel 
desk clerk gave police permission to enter the room and used a hotel key to open 
the door for the police.92 The state contended the search was reasonable because 
it was conducted with the consent of the hotel clerk.93 The Court disagreed.94 
 
85. 365 U.S. 610 (1961). 
86. Id. at 612. 
87. Id. 
88. See id. at 617.  
89. Id. at 617.  
90. In his dissent, Justice Clark emphatically declared that “‘Chapman was a tenant no more!’ [A 
Georgia] statute provided for the forfeiture of his lease at his lessor’s option when he began making whiskey on 
the premises.” Id. at 621 (Clark, J., dissenting). Thus, the search was reasonable, as Georgia law provided the 
landlord with a right of entry beyond that of mere discretion. See id. at 620-21. Justice Clark also found the 
police officers’ decision to forego a warrant reasonable because they would be unable to procure a warrant on 
Sunday, and the court record showed “complete reliance by the officers on [the landlord’s] direction to enter the 
house.” Id. at 622. According to Justice Clark, “[i]t is the duty of this Court to lay down those rules with such 
clarity and understanding that [the police] may be able to follow them. For some years now the field has been 
muddy, but today the Court makes it a quagmire. . . . It is disastrous to law enforcement to leave at large the 
inconsistent rules laid down in these cases.” Id. at 622-23. As Professor LaFave observes, “Chapman tells us 
little about what the theoretical basis of third party consent is.” LAFAVE, supra, note 15, § 8.3(a), at 144. 
Moreover, the lack of clarity in Chapman may have stemmed from the debate among the Justices regarding the 
warrant requirement. Compare Chapman, 365 U.S. at 618-19 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (joining the Court’s 
judgment on the basis that the “reasonableness” of a search turns in large measure on whether a judicial warrant 
authorized the search), with id. at 619-623 (Clark, J., dissenting) (Fourth Amendment only bars “unreasonable” 
searches, and the police reliance on the landlord’s authorization to enter Chapman’s home was a reasonable 
basis for the search).   
91. 376 U.S. 483 (1964). 
92. See id. at 485. 
93. Id. at 487-88. 
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Justice Stewart’s analysis in Stoner is still the subject of debate.95 He stated 
that there was no substance to the state’s claim that the police had a reasonable 
basis for believing that the hotel clerk had the authority to consent to the search 
of Stoner’s room.96 There was no substance to this claim because the Court’s 
rulings “make clear that the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to 
be eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or unrealistic doctrines of 
‘apparent authority.’”97 Justice Stewart emphasized that it was Stoner’s 
“constitutional right which was at stake here, and not the night clerk’s nor the 
hotel’s.”98 Accordingly, “[i]t was a right . . . which only [Stoner] could waive by 
word or deed, either directly or through an agent.”99 Finally, although the hotel 
clerk had explicitly consented to the search, “there [was] nothing in the record to 
indicate that the police had any basis whatsoever to believe that the night clerk 
had been authorized by [Stoner] to permit the police to search [his] room.”100 
Some have argued that Stoner’s logic establishes “that only a person whose 
own right is implicated can possess authority to consent.”101 Others contend that 
“the rationale of Stoner was ambiguous—and perhaps deliberately so” on the 
issue of whether the police could reasonably rely upon a third party’s permission 
to search another’s premises.102 Ultimately, the Rehnquist Court would embrace 
the latter view and conclude that “a warrantless entry is valid when based upon 
the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably 
 
94. Id. at 488. 
         95.  Compare Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 187-88 (1990) (“[T]he rationale of Stoner was 
ambiguous—and perhaps deliberately so.”), with id. at 194-95 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Stoner itself is 
clear, however; today’s majority manufactures the ambiguity.”).  
96. Id.. 
97. Stoner, 376 U.S. at 488.  
98. Id. at 489. 
99. Id.   
100. Id.  
101. Davies, supra note 7, at 30. Justice Marshall also adopts this position. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 
194-95 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“‘Our decisions make clear that the rights protected by the Fourth 
Amendment are not to be eroded by strained applications of the law of agency or by unrealistic doctrines of 
“apparent authority.”’ The full sentence thus unambiguously confirms that Stoner rejected any reliance on 
apparent authority doctrines. Nor did the Stoner Court leave open the door for a police officer to rely on a 
reasonable but mistaken belief in a third party’s authority to consent when it remarked that ‘there is nothing in 
the record to indicate that the police had any basis whatsoever to believe that the night clerk had been 
authorized by the petitioner to permit the police to search the petitioner’s room.’” (quoting Stoner, 376 U.S. at 
488-89)). 
102. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188. In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia found the Stoner holding—“the 
rights protected by the Fourth Amendment are not to be eroded . . . by unrealistic doctrines of ‘apparent 
authority’” id. at 187 (quoting Stoner, 376 U.S. at 488)—ambiguous, insofar as it was not clear “whether the 
word ‘unrealistic’ is descriptive or limiting—that is, whether we were condemning as unrealistic all reliance 
upon apparent authority, or whether we were condemning only such reliance upon apparent authority as is 
unrealistic.” Id. Moreover, Stoner was ambiguous as to whether the police officers’ reliance on the hotel clerk’s 
consent was unreasonable as “a matter of law, or because the facts could not possibly support it.” Id.  Under 
Scalia’s view, “a reasonable reading of [Stoner], and perhaps a preferable one,” is not that reliance on a third 
party’s consent is unreasonable as a matter of law, but that the factual circumstances of the consent in Stoner 
made such reliance unreasonable. Id. at 188. 
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believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not 
do so.”103 
The next important third-party consent case after Stoner was Frazier v. Cupp, 
although it might not have seemed so when it was decided in 1969.104 During the 
course of a murder investigation focused on Frazier and his cousin Rawls, police 
arrested Rawls and obtained his consent to search a duffel bag owned by Frazier, 
which was being used jointly by Frazier and Rawls and had been left in Rawls’ 
bedroom.105 Although never mentioned in the Court’s opinion, at the time of the 
search, the police were looking for evidence against Rawls, and there was no 
basis for suspecting that the search was aimed at discovering incriminating 
evidence against Frazier.106 The search of the duffel bag, however, revealed 
clothing belonging to Frazier, which was seized and admitted against Frazier at 
trial.107 Frazier later contended that Rawls only had permission to use one 
compartment of the bag and no authority to consent to a search of other 
compartments.108 Speaking for the Court, Justice Marshall “quickly” dismissed 
this argument in one cursory paragraph. Refusing to address the “metaphysical 
subtleties” inherent in Frazier’s claim that Rawls had no authority to consent to a 
search of the entire duffel bag, the Court easily concluded that because Frazier 
allowed Rawls to use the bag and had left it in Rawls’ home, Frazier had 
“assumed the risk” that Rawls would let the police search it.109 
Although not discussed in Frazier, there is an unresolved tension between 
Frazier’s “assumption of risk” logic and Stoner’s apparent rationale that “only 
the defendant or his agent could give effective consent” to a search.110 Professor 
LaFave provides the correct solution to this conflict when he notes that Frazier is 
 
103. Id. at 179, 188-89. 
104. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969). In between Stoner and Frazier, the Court decided Bumper v. 
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). The issue in Bumper was whether a search of a home could be justified 
on the basis of consent when such consent was given only after the police asserted that they possessed a 
warrant. Id. at 548. The Court held that “there can be no consent under such circumstances.” Id. Bumper 
explained that the state’s burden to prove consent cannot be satisfied when the facts indicated “no more than 
acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority.” Id. at 548-49. When a police officer “claims authority to search a 
home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is 
instinct with coercion—albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.” Id. 
at 550. 
105. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740. 
106. See Gladden v. Frazier, 388 F.2d 777, 783 (9th Cir. 1968) (explaining that the police “asked Rawls 
if they could have his clothing. . . . They did not know that the bag did not belong to Rawls until they opened it 
and found Frazier’s clothing in it.”); see also State v. Frazier, 418 P.2d 841, 843 (Or. 1966) (“The search was 
made with the consent of Jerry Rawls. This was not a general hunt for evidence of any kind; the bag was opened 
for the specific purpose of obtaining the clothing of Rawls and with his permission. . . . While it is true that at 
the time of Rawls’ arrest [Frazier] was a definite suspect and in detention, there is nothing in the record to 
disclose that the officers knew that the bag itself might be the property of anyone other than Rawls until the bag 
was opened and its contents noted.”).  
107. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 740. 
108. Id.. 
109. Id. 
110. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.3(a), at 146-47. 
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not “the typical third party consent case, where the police solicit the consent of A 
in order to search an area in which B has a privacy interest for the express 
purpose of finding evidence against B.”111 Put differently, the police in Frazier 
“did not perceive the situation as involving a third party consent” search.112 The 
main problem with this solution, however, is that the Court would not read 
Frazier the way LaFave read Frazier. Actions speak louder than words, and the 
Court’s actions soon indicated that Frazier’s assumption of risk theory would be 
applied broadly and extend to the typical third-party consent search case where 
the police seek the permission of A to invade the privacy of B. 
Without acknowledging the tension between Frazier and Stoner, United 
States v. Matlock113 demonstrated that a majority of the Justices accepted 
“assumption of risk” analysis as a sufficient doctrinal justification for third-party 
consent searches. At the same time, the Court also signaled rejection of Stoner’s 
suspect-focused analysis, which had indicated, if not held, that only the 
individual whose Fourth Amendment rights were at stake could consent to a 
search. In Matlock, law enforcement officers arrested Matlock for bank robbery 
in the front yard of his home.114 While Matlock was restrained in a police vehicle 
and without asking for his consent to search his room, several officers went to the 
front door of the house, where they were admitted to the home by a Mrs. Gayle 
Graff.115 “The officers told [Graff] they were looking for money and a gun and 
asked if they could search the house.”116 Graff gave the officers permission to 
search the house, including a bedroom “which she said was jointly occupied by 
Matlock and herself.”117 The search revealed incriminating evidence that the 
government to sought to admit at Matlock’s trial.118 
Decided less than a year after the ruling in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
Matlock explained that cases like Frazier established that when the state seeks to 
rely on voluntary consent to justify a search, “it is not limited to proof that 
consent was given by the defendant, but may show that permission to search was 
obtained from a third party who possessed common authority over or other 
sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.”119 The 
Court then elaborated in a footnote that the phrase “common authority” did not 
 
111. Id. at 147. 
112. Id. 
113. 415 U.S. 164 (1974). 
114. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 166. 
115. Id. at 166, 179.  
116. Id. at 166.  
117. Id.  
118. The lower courts upheld exclusion of the evidence on hearsay grounds. The Court, however, 
reversed. After finding that a third party who possessed authority over premises could consent to a search 
targeting a co-occupant, id. at 171, the Court also found that the government had sustained its burden of proving 
that Mrs. Graff’s out-of-court statements were legally sufficient to warrant admitting the incriminating evidence 
found in the police search. Id. at 177.  
119. Id. at 171. 
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turn on property law concepts,  
[B]ut rests rather on mutual use of the property by persons generally 
having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable 
to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the 
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that 
one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.120 
Put differently, Matlock upheld third-party consent searches on two 
independent grounds, either of which was sufficient to make a search 
constitutionally reasonable against a person who had legal standing to object to 
the search but had not been asked for his or her consent. Those grounds were that 
the third party could authorize the search “in his own right,” or that the defendant 
had “assumed the risk” that a co-occupant would allow the search.121 
While Matlock resolved the tension between Frazier and Stoner by 
embracing assumption of risk analysis, the Court’s solution raised some 
troublesome questions about the principled logic of the Court’s third-party 
consent analysis. As Professor LaFave wondered: 
If A and B jointly occupy certain premises, why is it (and when is it) that 
A’s “own right” to permit a search must prevail over B’s right of privacy 
in those premises? And to what extent may it truly be said that B’s 
expectation of privacy in a certain place has been destroyed simply 
because A enjoys equal property rights in that place?122 
Thirty years later, a sharply divided Court in Georgia v. Randolph attempted to 
answer, albeit not convincingly in the minds of some, some of Professor 
LaFave’s questions. 
A final comment about Matlock is worth mentioning. In a lone dissent, 
Justice Douglas concluded that the failure to obtain a warrant, when there was 
time to do so, made the search of Matlock’s home constitutionally 
unreasonable.123 Interestingly, Douglas reached this result by relying on the same 
reasoning that Justice Frankfurter had proffered in his dissent from Justice 
Douglas’ majority opinion in Davis. In Davis, Justice Frankfurther discussed the 
history of the Fourth Amendment and the Framers’ intent to control the 
discretionary search and seizure powers of law enforcement officers.124 
 
120. Id. at 171 n.7 (emphasis added). 
121. Matlock’s rationale only applied when the target of the search was absent when the police sought 
consent from a third party. See id. at 170 (noting that recent rulings indicate “that the consent of one who 
possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, nonconsenting person with 
whom that authority is shared” (emphasis added)).  
122. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.3(a), at 149. 
123. See Matlock, 415 U.S. at 178-88 (Douglas, J., dissenting).   
124. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 603-05 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  
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Frankfurter also cited Court precedents that had established that warrantless 
searches of homes and offices were unreasonable searches.125 In his Matlock 
dissent, Douglas returned to the same themes advanced by Frankfurter in his 
Davis dissent. 
For example, Douglas asserted that “[t]he judicial scrutiny provided by the 
second clause of the Amendment is essential to effectuating the Amendment, and 
if, under that clause a warrant could have been obtained but was not, the ensuing 
search is ‘unreasonable’ under the Amendment.”126 To support this assertion, 
Douglas dropped a long footnote discussing the history of oppressive search and 
seizure practices in the colonies. He pointed to the actions of members of the 
First Congress who revised the Fourth Amendment’s text, according to Douglas, 
to “strengthen the Amendment, not to license later judicial efforts to undercut the 
warrant requirement.”127 He also argued that the Court’s precedents in the mid-
twentieth century had “held that only the gravest of circumstances could excuse 
the failure to secure a properly issued search warrant.”128 Ultimately, Justice 
Douglas condemned the search of Matlock’s home, notwithstanding his 
girlfriend’s permission, because her consent “provide[d] a sorry and wholly 
inadequate substitute for the protections which inhere in a judicially granted 
warrant.”129 He was unwilling to accept the principle “that a search conducted 
without a warrant can give more authority than a search conducted with a 
warrant.”130 That result was at odds with the history and underlying purposes of 
the Amendment because “the Framers of the Amendment did not abolish the 
hated general warrants only to impose another oppressive regime on the 
people.”131 To put it mildy, there was a “dramatic evolution in Douglas’s 
thinking”132 on the Fourth Amendment since his decision in Davis. 
III. THE IMPACT OF SCHNECKLOTH V. BUSTAMONTE AND  
EXPLAINING ITS UNSPOKEN PREMISES 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte133 is considered the Court’s seminal search case 
 
125. Id. at 606-09.  
126. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 180 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
127. Id. at 180-83 n.1 (emphasis added).  
128. Id. at 183. 
129. Id. at 187.  
130. Id. This statement by Douglas echoed Justice Frankfurter’s earlier statement wherein he observed: 
“It cannot be that the Constitution meant to make it legally advantageous not to have a warrant, so that the 
police may roam freely and have the courts retrospectively hold that the search that was made was ‘reasonable,’ 
reasonableness being judged from the point of view of obtaining relevant evidence.” Davis v. United States, 328 
U.S. 582, 595 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
131. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 188 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Cf. Davis, 328 U.S. at 595 (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (opining that post facto judicial determinations that a warrantless search was reasonable “was 
precisely what the Fourth Amendment was meant to stop”). 
132. MURPHY, supra note 65, at 313.  
133. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
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for good reason. But Bustamonte has also been the target of severe and continued 
criticism. Bustamonte involved an ordinary traffic stop.134 After learning that the 
driver had no license, an officer was told by one of the passengers that he 
possessed a license and that his brother owned the vehicle. The officer then 
requested consent to search the car from that passenger. The passenger gave 
consent and “actually helped in the search of the car, by opening the trunk and 
glove compartment.”135 The search revealed stolen checks that were later used to 
convict Bustamonte, another passenger. After the California state courts upheld 
the conviction, the Ninth Circuit ruled that because consent constituted a waiver 
of one’s Fourth Amendment rights, the state had to show more than an absence 
of coercion.136 Under the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, the state also had to prove 
that consent was knowingly provided and could be freely refused.137 
A. The Emergence of the Voluntariness Test 
Bustamonte was an important case because it gave the Court an opportunity 
to clarify the law of consent, and, perhaps, develop a new way of analyzing 
consent searches.138 To begin with, there was no controlling precedent to guide 
the Court. As discussed above, prior to Bustamonte, the Court had not reached a 
consensus on how consent searches should be resolved, particularly in cases 
where police discover incriminating evidence against the person who gave 
consent.139 The holding in Davis certainly was not considered to be controlling 
by either the parties or the Justices. The briefs in Bustamonte virtually ignored 
Davis.140 And other than a couple of insignificant citations, Justice Stewart’s 
 
134. See id. at 220. 
135. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 220. 
136. Id. at 220-22; see also Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 700-01 (1971). 
137. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 221-22; Bustamonte, 448 F.2d at 700. 
138. Cf. Strauss, supra note 4, at 216 (“[I]t was not until 1973, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, that the 
Supreme Court clearly articulated the requirements for a voluntary consent search consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment.” (footnote omitted)); see also Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 279 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (after 
distinguishing Davis and Zap, noting that there are “no cases decided by th[e] Court explicitly upholding a 
search based on the consent of the defendant”). 
139. Technically speaking, Bustamonte was not a case where the police discovered incriminating 
evidence against the person who provided consent, because Bustamonte did not give consent to search the car 
he was riding in. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 220. Today, someone in Bustamonte’s shoes might not have 
standing to contest a police search of an automobile pursuant to consent. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 
148-49 (1978) (ruling that “passengers qua passengers” have no expectation of privacy—in other words, no 
“standing” to assert a Fourth Amendment interest—in “the trunk of an automobile, [the glove compartment, or 
area underneath the seat of an automobile because] these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger simply 
would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy”). Indeed, “the Bustamonte Court could have used 
an analysis akin to that in Rakas and found that no search affecting Bustamonte had occurred. Under that 
approach, the Bustamonte Court would not have reached the question of consent.” Goldberger, supra note 36, at 
328 (footnote omitted). 
140. The State’s opening brief cited Davis one time for the insignificant point that the Court consider 
consent to be a question of fact. Brief for the Petitioner at 12, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) 
(No. 71-732). The defendant’s brief never cited Davis. See Brief for Respondent, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
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main discussion of Davis in his thirty-one page majority opinion is contained in a 
single paragraph.141 That paragraph cites Davis to refute the lower court’s 
conclusion that proof of knowledge of the right to refuse consent is a pre-
condition to showing a voluntary consent.142 Davis, according to Bustamonte, 
stood for the proposition that the judiciary must consider all the circumstances to 
determine whether consent was coerced or not.143 Nor were the third-party 
consent cases determinative in Bustamonte. In fact, Stewart conceded the issue at 
stake in Bustamonte was “what constitutes a valid consent, not who can 
consent.”144 Tellingly, the holdings in the third-party consent search cases were 
cited near the end of Stewart’s opinion to bolster the previously determined 
conclusion that a knowing waiver was not required to prove valid consent under 
the Fourth Amendment.145 
Although the Court was writing on a clean slate, it was obvious that the 
Bustamonte majority had reached a pre-determined outcome. The Court’s 
framing of the issue signaled the desired result. According to Justice Stewart, 
“the precise question” raised in Bustamonte was “what must the prosecution 
prove to demonstrate that a consent was ‘voluntarily’ given.”146 But as Professor 
LaFave has explained, framing the issue this way is “grossly misleading” and 
determines the outcome all at once.147 Justice Stewart’s framing of the issue is 
deceptive because, as LaFave observes, the facts raised at least two questions: 
whether one’s Fourth Amendment rights could be lost “through coercion only,” 
or whether one’s Fourth Amendment rights could also be lost “by unknowing 
surrender.”148 These are separate inquires. But Justice Stewart focuses only on 
 
412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732). Nor was Davis discussed during oral argument. See Transcript of Oral 
Argument, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732).  
141. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 233. 
142. See id. at 232-33.  
143. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 233. Justice Marshall’s dissent in Bustamonte, however, suggested that 
Davis’ specific holding was no longer valid law. He noted that central to the result in Davis was that the items 
seized were governmental property, temporarily in Davis’ possession. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 279 n.4 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Because the search involved government property, the Davis Court concluded that 
“permissible limits of persuasion are not so narrow as where private papers are sought.” Davis, 328 U.S. at 593. 
Marshall argued that the distinction between governmental property and other types evidentiary items, so far as 
the Fourth Amendment was concerned, was eliminated in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 279 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Rotenberg, supra note 28, at 176 n.9 
(“Although consent can be said to be a factor in the Court’s analysis in [Davis and Zap], the fact that 
‘businesses were being inspected’ seems to be a larger factor. Neither case defines consent for constitutional 
purposes.”). 
144.  Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 246 n.34 (emphasis added). Justice Stewart did observe, however, that 
“the constitutional validity of third-party consents demonstrates the fundamentally different nature of a consent 
search from the waiver of a trial right.” Id. 
145. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 245-46. 
146. Id. at 223. 
147. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.1(a), at 12. 
148. Id. As Professor LaFave elaborates 
The Court actually had before it the question of whether Fourth Amendment rights were to be 
protected from loss through coercion only or also protected from loss by unknowing surrender. 
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the coercion question.149 Equally telling that the Court had reached a pre-
determined result is the Court’s use of a “voluntariness” standard to determine 
the constitutional validity of a consent search.150 Justice Stewart never bothered 
explaining why he would “import[] into the consent search area the traditional 
‘voluntariness’ test, which proved so ineffective and unworkable in the 
confession field that it was largely superseded by the new requirements of 
Miranda v. Arizona.”151    
Moreover, Justice Stewart never considers, let alone addresses, the argument 
that the search in Bustamonte conflicted with the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
and probable cause requirements. To be sure, in dicta, the Court had assumed 
prior to Bustamonte that consent was a valid exception to the warrant 
requirement.152 And counsel for Bustamonte conceded during oral argument that 
“consent searches are permissible under the Constitution.”153 But in the next 
breath, he also pointed out that the search in Bustamonte occurred “even though 
there [was] no warrant, no probable cause, no one ha[d] been questioned about 
any specific crime, no one [was] under arrest,” there was no threat to police 
safety, and there was not “even the remotest effort made to determine if [the 
person providing consent] had any notion at all of his right to resist the 
search.”154 Granted, the search at issue intruded upon the privacy of an 
automobile, not a private home, which may have lessened the intrusive nature of 
the search in the minds of some of the Justices. But, two years earlier, Justice 
Stewart himself warned that “[t]he word ‘automobile’ is not a talisman in whose 
presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.”155 In any event, 
there was no indication that the Court was inclined to assess the constitutionality 
of a consent search by examining whether the traditional protections embodied in 
the Fourth Amendment had been satisfied. 
In sum, the procedural safeguards that the Court had mandated in the early 
 
These are two different matters; a person might surrender his privacy in full knowledge of his Fourth 
Amendment rights but yet in response to overwhelming police pressure, or might give up his privacy 
without the slightest pressure but because of unawareness of his right to decline a police request to 
search. Yet, to speak only of voluntariness is immediately to focus on the problem of coercion. 
Id. 
149. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 223-29. 
150. Id. 
151. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.2, at 51 (footnote omitted).  
152. Justice Stewart implied as much in Katz. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58 & n.22 
(1967) (“[T]he mandate of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial processes,” and “[a] search 
to which an individual consents meets Fourth Amendment requirements.” (citing United States v. Jeffers, 342 
U.S. 48, 51 (1951); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624 (1946))).  
153. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732); 
see also id. at 49 (defense counsel assuming that a person can make a voluntary decision to let the police search 
his home or car, but stating “my position is that it can only be done if you are aware of your right to say no”). 
154. Id. at 25. 
155. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971) (plurality opinion). Tellingly, there is no 
suggestion in Bustamonte that the result in that case would have been different had the consent search been 
directed at a home. 
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twentieth century to ensure that a search was reasonable were no longer part of 
the discussion in 1973 when the Court analyzed the reasonableness of the search 
in Bustamonte. And even assuming that consent was a valid exception to the 
warrant and probable cause requirements, Justice Stewart’s own conception of 
the scope of a valid exception was not discussed in Bustamonte. Two years 
before he authored the Court’s opinion in Bustamonte, Stewart wrote that 
searches conducted without judicial approval “are per se unreasonable”—subject 
to a few exceptions.156 Those exceptions, Stewart explained, “are ‘jealously and 
carefully drawn,’ and there must be ‘a showing by those who seek exemption . . . 
that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.’”157 The consent 
exception envisioned and eventually constructed by the Bustamonte Court, 
however, was not “carefully drawn,” was not designed to protect officer safety, 
and not required by any exigency that made a search imperative under the 
circumstances. 
By focusing his analysis on whether a challenged consent search was the 
result of coercion or not, and ignoring the Fourth Amendment’s traditional 
safeguards and his own formulation of the scope of a valid exception to the 
amendment, Justice Stewart could announce a holding in Bustamonte that 
appeared straightforward and easily applied by lower court judges and police 
officers. Bustamonte ruled that when the state defends a search on the basis of 
consent, it has the burden of proving that the consent was voluntary.158 
“Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances 
and while the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into 
account, the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a 
prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.”159 In another part of his opinion, 
Justice Stewart explained that “voluntariness” permitted consideration of 
subjective factors specific to the person giving consent, including, for example, 
“evidence of minimal schooling, low intelligence, and the lack of any effective 
warnings to a person of his rights.”160 
B. The Unspoken Premises that Influenced the Bustamonte Court 
Bustamonte’s holding was widely criticized when it was announced.161 The 
 
156. Id. at 454-55. 
157. Id. at 455 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948)). A year before 
Bustamonte was decided, the Court stated that exceptions to the warrant requirement “are few in number and 
carefully delineated,” and that, “in general, they serve the legitimate needs of law enforcement officers to 
protect their own well-being and preserve evidence from destruction.” United States v. U.S. Dist. Court, 407 
U.S. 297, 318 (1972) (citations omitted). 
158. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222, 248. 
159. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 248-49. 
160. Id. at 248. 
161. See LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.1(a), at 11 n.28 (providing citations). 
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ruling is still harshly criticized today.162 Rather than repeat this criticism, much 
of which I find convincing, at this stage in the still evolving development of the 
law of consent, it may be more helpful to identify the concerns and mode of 
thinking that affected the Bustamonte Court. Looking back, some of the concerns 
that influenced the Bustamonte Court were not openly discussed in Justice 
Stewart’s majority opinion. As I hope to demonstrate, the unspoken premises that 
motivated the Bustamonte Court continue to impact the analysis and rulings of 
the current Justices. This section attempts to identify some of these concerns. 
In Bustamonte, the Ninth Circuit ruled that to prove valid consent, the state 
had to show both an absence of coercion and that the subject knew he could 
refuse consent.163 As understood by the Bustamonte majority, the Ninth Circuit 
had formulated a rigid rule that consent could not be established “solely from the 
absence of coercion and a verbal expression of assent.”164 Several factors 
prompted the Court to reject this rule. 
First, Justice Stewart never indulged, let alone accepted, the Ninth Circuit’s 
view that “[u]nder many circumstances a reasonable person might read an 
officer’s ‘May I’ as the courteous expression of a demand backed by force of 
law.”165 Indeed, Bustamonte appeared to adopt the opposite conclusion: an 
officer’s requesting consent indicates that the subject has the ability to refuse. 
 
162. For a sampling of the criticism, see, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.1(a), at 12-15; Wesley 
MacNeil Oliver, With an Evil Eye and an Unequal Hand: Pretextual Stops and Doctrinal Remedies to Racial 
Profiling, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1409, 1467-76 (2000); James A. Adams, Search and Seizure as Seen by Supreme 
Court Justices: Are They Serious or Is This Just Judicial Humor?, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 413, 446-49 
(1993); Robert V. Ward, Consenting to a Search and Seizure in Poor and Minority Neighborhoods: No Place 
for a “Reasonable Person”, 36 HOW. L.J. 239, 244-45 (1993); Adrian J. Barrio, Rethinking Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte: Incorporating Obedience Theory Into the Supreme Court’s Conception of Voluntary Consent, 
1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 215; Rotenberg, supra note 28; Strauss, supra note 4; Thomas, supra note 8, at 545-46 . A 
recent symposium of the Texas Tech Law Review contained four articles by Professors John M. Burkoff, 
Morgan Cloud, Christo Lassiter, and Russell L. Weaver discussing the Court’s consent search doctrine. See 
Symposium, Citizen Ignorance, Police Deception, and the Constitution, 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1109-1206 
(2007). None of these articles had a kind or positive word about Bustamonte. See, e.g., Burkoff, supra note 5, at 
1113-32; Cloud, supra note 15, at 1148-58; Christo Lassiter, Consent to Search by Ignorant People, 39 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 1171, 1176 (2007) (“No choice is made by one who is ignorant of the right of refusal of consent. 
Without knowledge or intelligence concerning options, there can be no choice among options. Without 
knowledge and intelligence, a choice can be made without physical violence or threat of violence; however, one 
could argue that such a choice is not, and cannot, truly be, voluntary.”); Russell L. Weaver, The Myth of 
“Consent,” 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1195, 1198 (2007) (“From the standpoint of constitutional doctrine, it is 
difficult to justify the [Bustamonte] holding or to understand how a suspect can waive an important 
constitutional right without knowledge of its existence.”).  
       163.    Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1971) (determining consent, court must 
“determine from all the circumstances whether the verbal assent reflected an understanding, uncoerced, and 
unequivocal election to grant the officers a license which the person knows may be freely and effectively 
withheld” (quoting Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1965))).     
164. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 222. 
165. Bustamonte, 448 F.2d at 701. Although Justice Stewart never bothered to reply to this conclusion, 
both Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall endorsed this view. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 275-76 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting); id. at 288-89 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s statement and further 
noting that in most cases, “consent is ordinarily given as acquiescence in an implicit claim of authority to 
search”). 
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Because Justice Stewart viewed a request for consent as non-coercive, he never 
challenged the state’s contention that “the very fact that consent is given carries 
the implication that an alternative of refusal existed.”166 Essentially, the state was 
asking the Court to embrace the following proposition: A person’s conduct or 
verbal assent following an officer’s request for consent was sufficient to 
demonstrate, without more, a prima facie case of consent. Once a prima facie 
case was shown, the burden was on the defendant to show something unusual 
about the police questioning that made the consent coerced or some other overt 
act of police coercion.167 If no evidence of overt coercion was present, then a 
request for consent and verbal assent or conduct manifesting acquiescence, 
standing alone, could prove valid consent as a matter of law.168 In effect, the state 
was asking the Court to reject the Ninth Circuit’s per se rule and substitute in its 
place another bright-line rule. 
Concededly, the state’s claim was never cited in Justice Stewart’s opinion; 
thus there is no definitive proof that the Bustamonte majority embraced the 
state’s position. Even so, Stewart was known as a justice who “paid careful 
attention to briefs and oral argument.”169 Moreover, although Justice Stewart 
never expressly cited the prosecution’s argument that a request for consent 
carries the implication that a right of refusal exists, he was undoubtedly aware of 
the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Bustamonte. That ruling specifically rejected the 
California state courts’ understanding of consent, which approved the principle 
that “the mere request for consent carries with it an implication that consent may 
be withheld and that knowledge of this implication may be inferred from 
assent.”170 Perhaps, in the eyes of a majority of the Justices, the state’s 
 
166.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 11, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (No. 71-732); 
see also id. at 13: 
QUESTION: As I understand your brief, your argument in part was that the very fact of a request by 
the officer gave - - amounted to an inference, an indication that the request could be denied. 
MR. GRANUCCI: Yes, that’s right, Mr. Chief Justice. And the Ninth Circuit discounted that by 
saying that verbal assent is not enough. 
167. Cf. id. at 51: 
QUESTION: So you’re saying that on the evidence in this record there was a prima facie case for 
consent? 
MR. GRANUCCI: Yes. 
. . . 
QUESTION: And as long as the officer asks, and he consents then at least the burden of going 
forward with the evidence shifts? 
MR. GRANUCCI: I think that’s right, Your Honor. Although I would say this, that if you had guns 
or something like that, that’s - - 
QUESTION: Well, obviously. 
. . . 
MR. GRANUCCI: . . . Verbal expression of permission to search. Then you look for no implied 
assertion of authority, and of course no overt coercion.” 
168. See id. 
169. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 262 (1994). 
170.    Bustamonte, 448 F. 2d at 700; see also People v. Bustamonte, 76 Cal. Rptr. 17, 20 (Ct. App. 1969) 
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submission that requesting consent carries with it the implication that an 
alternative of refusal existed was so intuitively correct there was no need to 
reference or address the claim. Whatever the case, looking back, it seems the 
Bustamonte majority agreed with the state’s position that an officer’s request for 
consent and verbal assent was enough to place, if not the legal burden, a tacit 
burden on the defendant to offer other evidence proving an invalid consent. In 
fact, that was the conclusion mandated by Bustamonte’s judgment when, rather 
than remanding the case to the Ninth Circuit so that it could apply the 
“voluntariness” test newly announced by the Court, Justice Stewart determined 
that under the facts presented, there was no reason to believe that the response to 
the police request for consent was “presumptively coerced.”171 
The second and perhaps most important factor that influenced the result in 
Bustamonte was the Court’s determination not to create another Miranda.172 The 
contrast in judicial perspective between Miranda and Bustamonte is striking. In 
the aftermath of Escobedo v. Illinois,173 the Court was poised to issue a major 
announcement on the constitutionality of police interrogation practices.174 As 
Miranda demonstrated, a majority of the Court believed that interrogation 
practices, as then existed, were manipulative and coercive of the suspect, and, 
thus, threatened core values embodied in the Fifth Amendment’s Self-
Incrimination Clause.175 These concerns produced Miranda, which ruled that 
persons subjected to custodial interrogation by the police must be informed of 
their right to remain silent and right to have counsel present.176 Under Miranda, 
custodial interrogation may not occur unless the suspect specifically waives his 
or her rights to remain silent and the presence of counsel.177 
Seven years later, when the constitutionality of consent searches was 
 
(explaining the basic premise of California law on consent: “When permission is sought from a person of 
ordinary intelligence the very fact that consent is given . . . carries the implication that the alternative of a 
refusal existed.” (quoting People v. MacIntosh, 70 Cal. Rptr. 667, 670 (1968))). 
171. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 247 (“There is no reason to believe, under circumstances such as are 
present here, that the response to a policeman’s question is presumptively coerced[.]”). 
172. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
173. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (holding that Escobedo’s confession, taken during a police interrogation 
session while he was under arrest and after he had requested and been denied access to his lawyer, violated the 
Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel and was inadmissible at Escobedo’s trial).  
174. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 87-88 (1983) (describing the “legal 
quagmire” created by Escobedo, and the collection of certiorari petitions that presented Escobedo issues). Cf. 
Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure: From Powell 
to Gideon, From Escobedo to  . . . , in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME 55-64 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965) 
(describing the easy questions arising from Escobedo, which “most state courts are muffing,” and the hard 
questions, which courts “are unlikely to reach”); Developments in the Law: Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 
1001 (1966) (noting post-Escobedo federal appeals court rulings interpreting Escobedo as merely “reworking” 
the voluntariness test for determining the admissiblity of confessions, despite the fact that the Escobedo Court 
refused to address the voluntariness issue and the “explicit sixth amendment foundation” of Escobedo’s 
holding). 
175.  See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58. 
176.  Id. at 467-72. 
177.  Id. at 475. 
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addressed, a majority of the Justices held no skepticism toward consent searches. 
There was no angst or anger about consent searches similar to the feelings that 
bothered the majority in Miranda regarding incommunicado police interrogation. 
Consent searches were good, not bad.178 And certainly the Bustamonte Court felt 
no need, let alone urgency, to level the playing-field between officer and suspect 
as the Miranda Court had attempted to do when it mandated its famous warnings. 
To the contrary, the Court repeatedly emphasized that “the community has a real 
interest in encouraging consent, for the resulting search may yield necessary 
evidence for the solution and prosecution of crime, evidence that may insure that 
a wholly innocent person is not wrongly charged with a criminal offense.”179 This 
perspective, when combined with the previous discussed factor that the 
Bustamonte majority believed that the typical police request for consent was not 
coercive, made it easy to reject extending Miranda’s logic to consent searches. In 
fact, Justice Stewart likened a request for a consent search to a police officer’s 
questioning of a pedestrian or witness who is knowledgeable about the facts 
surrounding a crime.180 This type of non-custodial questioning does not trigger 
Miranda warnings, and Stewart pointed out that Miranda itself stated that “‘[i]t is 
an act of responsible citizenship for individuals to give whatever information 
they may have to aid in law enforcement.’”181 Justice Stewart characterized 
Miranda-type warnings in this context as “artificial restrictions” that would 
jeopardize “the basic validity” of consent searches.182 
Finally, the Bustamonte Court must have believed that its ruling provided 
sufficient means to identify actual instances of unlawful consent and would not 
allow police to coerce consent or take advantage of vulnerable persons. Although 
not stated as such, Bustamonte’s “voluntariness” standard was actually a 
 
178. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 229 (noting the “basic validity” of consent searches and the “continuing 
validity of consent searches”). 
179. Id. at 243.  
180. Id. at 231-32.  
181. Id. at 232 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-78 (1966)).  
182. Id. at 229. Justice Stewart’s determination not to create another Miranda certainly impacted his 
thinking on consent searches specifically and the Fourth Amendment generally. Justice Stewart opined that the 
typical consent search was the equivalent of a judicially authorized search. Thus, he stated “[t]he actual conduct 
of [a consent] search may be precisely the same as if the police had obtained a warrant.” Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 
at 243. Of course, far from being the equivalent of a judicially authorized search, assent to a consent search 
gives the police the authority and discretion to perform an open-ended search with virtually no limits. See 
accompanying text supra notes 18-20. The irony here is that Stewart has traditionally been considered a strong 
proponent of the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) 
(plurality opinion) (“[T]he most basic constitutional rule . . . is that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial 
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’” (quoting Katz v. United States, 
389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))); id. at 481; H. Richard Uviller, Reasonability and the Fourth Amendment: A 
(Belated) Farewell to Justice Potter Stewart,  25 CRIM. L. BULL. 29, 33 n.14 (1989) (“I suggest only that in the 
seminal 1960’s, Stewart led the contingent that found in the Fourth Amendment a preference for searches and 
seizures by warrant.”). 
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balancing test.183 Part of that balancing test permitted consideration of “the set of 
values reflecting society’s deeply felt belief that the criminal law cannot be used 
as an instrument of unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair and even brutal 
police tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized notions of justice.”184 
Thus, the Court explained that the “voluntariness” test allowed for consideration 
of the “characteristics of the accused.”185 It also required “the most careful 
scrutiny” of police conduct.186 Lastly, the Court emphasized the narrow scope of 
its holding. Three times Justice Stewart stated that the Court’s holding only 
applied to persons “not in custody.”187 
In sum, important premises, some of which were unspoken, provided the 
foundation for Bustamonte. Identifying these viewpoints may help us better 
understand the origins of Bustamonte’s holding. Not surprisingly, a few of the 
premises that supported Bustamonte continue to impact the development of the 
law of consent searches. But the modern Court’s willingness to follow 
Bustamonte’s logic and holding has been uneven and unpredictable. In fact, the 
modern Justices have abandoned significant aspects of Bustamonte. 
C. The Declining Significance of Bustamonte and the Rise of a “Reasonable-
ness” Model for Judging Consent Searches 
Bustamonte’s legacy with the modern Court has been interesting to observe. 
In some cases, both the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have upheld consent 
searches in scenarios considerably more coercive than the facts in Bustamonte 
and justified these rulings as being dictated by Bustamonte. In other cases, it is 
evident that the Court has discarded Bustamonte’s voluntariness test and 
substituted a standard of review that affords considerable deference to police 
efforts to obtain a person’s consent. 
Some of the post-Bustamonte rulings reveal that the modern Court has 
transformed Bustamonte from its self-described narrow, fact-specific holding to a 
ruling that adopts a presumption of valid consent whenever the police ask for 
consent and there is assent, even in contexts that differ dramatically from the 
 
183. Justice Stewart acknowledged that there was no ready definition for the concept of “voluntariness.” 
See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 224 (quoting Justice Frankfurter’s observation that “‘[t]he notion of 
“voluntariness” is itself an amphibian”). Justice Stewart then explained that “‘voluntariness’ has reflected an 
accommodation of the complex of values implicated in police questioning of a suspect.” Id. at 224-25; see also 
Strauss, supra note 4, at 217 (“[T]he Court . . . decided to base its definition of voluntariness on a consideration 
of the competing policy considerations. That is, the Court held that the meaning of voluntary consent must 
reflect a balance between the conflicting interests involved in police searches.”). 
184. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 225. 
185. See id. at 226. 
186. Id. at 229. The Court stated, “In examining all the surrounding circumstances to determine if in fact 
the consent to search was coerced, account must be taken of subtly coercive police questionings, as well as the 
possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents. Those searches that are the product of police 
coercion can thus be filtered out without undermining the continuing validity of consent searches.” Id. 
187. Id. at 248; see also id. at 240-41 n.29, 247 & n.36. 
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scenario involved in Bustamonte. Consider the results in United States v. 
Watson188 and Ohio v. Robinette.189 Both of these cases reveal that Bustamonte’s 
“narrow” holding posed no bar against extending that ruling to scenarios 
involving significantly more police pressure. As noted above, Bustamonte 
emphasized that its holding did not apply to the situation where police sought 
consent from a person in police custody.190 The Bustamonte Court not only 
acknowledged “the heightened possibilities for coercion when the ‘consent’ to 
search was given by a person in custody,”191 it specifically relied upon the 
distinction between custodial and non-custodial police questioning for its 
holding.192 Despite this significant limitation on the scope of Bustamonte’s 
holding, Watson and Robinette read Bustamonte as if that restriction never 
existed. 
In United States v. Watson, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Watson’s arrest was 
unconstitutional because federal law enforcement officers had failed to secure an 
arrest warrant during a time period when they had probable cause to arrest 
Watson.193 The Ninth Circuit also ruled that Watson’s consent to search his car, 
given to the officer shortly after his arrest but without knowledge of his right to 
withhold consent, was illegally obtained.194 The Court, in an opinion written by 
Justice White, reversed the Ninth Circuit on both issues.195 Most of Justice 
White’s opinion is devoted to answering the question of whether the Fourth 
Amendment requires a warrant for a public arrest, even when the police have 
time to secure a warrant.196 After answering that question in the negative, White 
turned to the consent issue, which had not been addressed in any detail by the 
court below, nor “thoroughly briefed” by the parties.197 Namely, what standard 
should apply to determine the validity of a search that is authorized by the 
consent of a person in lawful police custody. 
Justice White quickly resolved this issue, making it appear as if Bustamonte 
had already decided the question. He observed that there was no evidence of 
 
188. 423 U.S. 411 (1976). 
189. 519 U.S. 33 (1996). 
190. See supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text. 
191. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 240 n.29. 
192. Id. at 247 (“In this case, there is no evidence of any inherently coercive tactics—either from the 
nature of the police questioning or the environment in which it took place. Indeed, since consent searches will 
normally occur on a person's own familiar territory, the specter of incommunicado police interrogation in some 
remote station house is simply inapposite. There is no reason to believe, under circumstances such as are 
present here, that the response to a policeman’s question is presumptively coerced; and there is, therefore, no 
reason to reject the traditional test for determining the voluntariness of a person’s response.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
193. United States v. Watson, 504 F. 2d 849, 852 (9th Cir. 1974). 
194. Id. at 852-853. 
195. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 414-15, 423-25 (1976). 
196. See id. at 414-24. 
197.    Id. at 456 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
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overt or subtle coercion against Watson “proved or claimed.”198 Nor was custody 
by itself sufficient to show coerced consent.199 According to Justice White, the 
absence of evidence that Watson knew of his right to refuse consent, albeit a 
factor to consider, was not controlling under Bustamonte.200 Finally, Justice 
White stated that despite being given Miranda warnings and told that “the results 
of the search of his car could be used against him,” Watson still consented.201 Put 
another way, an officer’s request to search and a suspect’s assent indicates that 
refusal was considered and rejected. This was enough to establish consent as a 
matter of law. A contrary result, White asserted, would be inconsistent with 
Bustamonte’s voluntariness standard.202 
In Robinette, the Court framed the issue as “whether the Fourth Amendment 
requires that a lawfully seized defendant be advised that he is ‘free to go’ before 
his consent will be recognized as voluntary.”203 A unanimous Court concluded 
that no such advice was necessary to obtain a valid consent.204 As in Watson, the 
Robinette Court addressed the consent issue as if Bustamonte had already 
decided the merits. In summary fashion, Robinette explained that Bustamonte had 
already rejected adopting any per se rules for determining the validity of a 
consent search.205 Likewise, Robinette noted that just as Bustamonte had 
concluded that it was impractical to have police provide warnings before 
obtaining consent, “so too would it be unrealistic to require police officers to 
always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent search may be 
deemed voluntary.”206 
Watson and Robinette show that the Court is quick to extend, without much 
analysis, Bustamonte’s holding to scenarios involving significant police coercion. 
The request for consent in Watson occurred while the defendant was under 
arrest.207 Both Miranda and Bustamonte expressly recognized that there is a 
constitutional difference between custodial and non-custodial police questioning. 
In Watson, Justice White brushes aside this difference by asserting that “the fact 
of custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a coerced 
confession or consent to search.”208 Justice White’s assertion is misleading for 
 
198.    Id. at 424 (majority opinion).  
199. Id. at 424-25.  Although Justice White relied on Bustamonte, he did not pause to acknowledge that 
the Bustamonte Court considered consent obtained from a person in custody to be a very significant (and 
apparently troubling) factor, so much so that the Court reserved judgment on the issue. See Bustamonte, 412 
U.S. at 240-41 n.29, 247 n.36.  
200.   Watson, 423 U.S. at 424.  
201.   Id. at 425. 
202.   Id. 
203.   Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996). 
204. Id. at 35. 
205. Id. at 39. 
206. Id. at 39-40. 
207.    Watson, 423 U.S. at 413.  
208.    Watson, 423 U.S. at 424.  
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two reasons. First, Watson’s consent claim was not based on the fact of custody 
alone. The consent in Watson was the product of custody and police questioning. 
Miranda held that custodial interrogation is presumed to be inherently coercive. 
If interrogation of a suspect in custody is coercive, “it is not easy to see why it is 
not likewise [coercive] with respect to the solicitation of consent to search from 
one in custody.”209 Second, the thrust of Watson’s consent claim was not that 
custody by itself had been, or was then, sufficient to show coercion. Rather, his 
claim raised the question whether custody is enough to justify applying a 
different rule than the one announced in Bustamonte. The fears raised in 
Bustamonte against requiring the police to provide warnings disappear once the 
suspect is in custody.210 More importantly, custody changes the dynamics of the 
police-citizen encounter to favor the police, as Bustamonte recognized.211 These 
differences, however, were neither acknowledged nor addressed by the Watson 
majority. 
Robinette raises similar concerns about the Court extending Bustamonte’s 
holding without serious analysis, although the case is closer to Bustamonte than 
Watson. Robinette, like Bustamonte, involved the detention of a motorist for a 
traffic stop; factually, the cases were similar. What made Robinette different 
from Bustamonte were not the facts, but legal doctrine. The Court’s own caselaw, 
as it developed since Bustamonte, recognized that the exchange between officer 
and citizen during a traffic stop was not an “arm’s length” meeting. Justice 
Stewart’s opinion in Bustamonte analogized a request for a consent search to an 
officer questioning a pedestrian who is not in police custody or otherwise subject 
to seizure by the police.212 After Bustamonte, however, the Court ruled that 
whenever police stop a motorist in transit, a seizure has occurred under the 
Fourth Amendment. Stopping a vehicle and detaining and questioning its 
occupants is a seizure, “even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the 
resulting detention quite brief.”213 Moreover, the Court stated that a traffic stop 
 
209. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.2(i), at 113. Of course, the provision of Miranda warnings to Watson 
is of no consequence because those warnings did not inform Watson of his Fourth Amendment right to withhold 
consent to search his car. A specific Fourth Amendment warning that a suspect in custody has a right to 
withhold consent and that refusal will be respected by the police “may serve to fortify the accused against the 
coercion inherent in the custodial setting.” Gentile v. United States, 419 U.S. 979, 981 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
210. See Gentile, 419 U.S at 981-82 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted): 
[Bustamonte] believed that warning the subject of his right to refuse [consent] would be 
“impractical” under the “informal and unstructured conditions” of a roadside search. Yet the 
circumstances under which an arrestee in police custody meets with his captors are hardly 
“unstructured.” When a suspect is in custody the situation is in control of the police. The pace of 
 events will not somehow deny them an opportunity to give a warning, as the [Bustamonte] Court 
apparently feared  would happen in noncustodial settings. Moreover, the custodial setting will permit 
easy documentation of both the giving of a warning and the arrestee’s response. 
211. See Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 232, 247 (“In this case, there is no evidence of any inherently coercive 
tactics—either from the nature of the police questioning or the environment in which it took place.”). 
212. Id. 
213. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). 
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can involve an “unsettling show of authority” and often generates “substantial 
anxiety”214 even for the innocent motorist. Seven years after Bustamonte was 
decided, even Justice Stewart recognized that “[s]topping or diverting an 
automobile in transit . . . is materially more intrusive than a question put to a 
passing pedestrian.”215 In another case, the Court recognized that “[c]ertainly few 
motorists would feel free to either disobey a directive to pull over or to leave the 
scene of a traffic stop without being told they might do so.”216 Accordingly, the 
Court ruled that motorists arrested for misdemeanor offenses are in “custody” for 
purposes of Miranda and are entitled to warnings before being questioned by the 
police.217 
The Court’s cases decided between Bustamonte and Robinette also 
recognized that police officers have substantial discretion when deciding which 
motorists to stop and how each stop will be resolved.218 The typical motorist is 
aware of this discretionary authority, which, of course, adds to the tension of the 
ordinary traffic stop. Because an officer might abuse his or her authority either in 
deciding which motorists to stop or how those stops will be resolved, the Court 
has imposed constitutional rules for motorist detentions that are not applicable to 
police-pedestrian encounters. Furthermore, the motorist seized in a traffic stop is 
not positioned to know the lawful limits of the officer’s authority, nor the extent 
of his own right to leave or terminate the seizure. All of these Fourth Amendment 
concerns, developed subsequent to Bustamonte, prompted the Ohio Supreme 
Court to rule that before police request consent to search from a motorist who 
was previously subject to seizure, the police must inform the motorist that they 
are free to leave.219 Notwithstanding this altered legal landscape, the Robinette 
Court saw no difference between the consent issue presented in Bustamonte and 
the issue raised in Robinette. 
While Watson and Robinette indicate that the modern Court is still willing to 
utilize aspects of Bustamonte to encourage consent searches, other rulings show 
that the Court will ignore Bustamonte’s voluntariness test and employ an 
objective, “reasonableness” standard that provides great deference, if not outright 
encouragement, to consent searches. For example, Florida v. Jimeno220 and 
United States v. Drayton,221 discussed below in Section III of this article, 
demonstrate that the Court has eliminated any consideration of a suspect’s 
 
214.    Id. at 657.  
215. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 556-57 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
216. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436 (1984). 
217. Id. at 429, 434. 
218. See, e.g., Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659, 661 (noting that “[v]ehicle stops for traffic violations occur 
countless times each day,” and every motorist is subject to a “multitude of applicable traffic and equipment 
regulations”—rules which are not applicable to pedestrians—that give police substantial discretion on deciding 
which motorists to stop). 
219.  See State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695, 699 (Ohio 1995). 
220. 500 U.S. 248 (1991). 
221. 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
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subjective characteristics when determining whether the police acted lawfully 
when obtaining consent and when deciding the scope of a suspect’s consent.222 
Indeed, Jimeno best illustrates the modern Court’s abandonment of Bustamonte’s 
“voluntariness” test and its substitution of a “reasonableness” test that considers 
only objective facts or criteria.223 
Specifically, Jimeno concerned the scope of a person’s consent when they 
give police permission to search the interior of their automobile. Jimeno had been 
stopped for a traffic violation.224 The officer told Jimeno that he suspected that 
drugs were in the vehicle and asked for consent to search the vehicle.225 Although 
the officer informed Jimeno that he did not have to provide consent, the officer 
also informed Jimeno that if he did not provide consent, the officer would seek a 
warrant to search the car.226 After Jimeno gave permission to search the vehicle, 
the officer opened a brown paper bag that was laying on the floorboard and found 
cocaine inside.227 The trial court found that Jimeno’s “mere consent to search the 
car did not carry with it specific consent to open the bag and examine its 
contents.”228 Despite this finding, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that “[t]he 
standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the Fourth 
Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical 
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the 
suspect?”229 Thus, even when the question concerns what a suspect intended 
when he gave consent to search, the suspect’s subjective characteristics or state 
of mind are constitutionally irrelevant.230 
Watson, Robinette, and Jimeno demonstrate at least two things about how the 
 
222. In two post-Bustamonte cases, Watson and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), the 
Court did discuss the defendant’s subjective characteristics in determining whether the consent provided to the 
police was voluntary. See Watson, 423 U.S. at 424-25; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 558-59 (plurality opinion). 
223. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249-51. 
224. Id. at 249. 
225. Id. 
 226. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
1016, 1064 n.175 (1995) (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 
248 (1991) (No. 90-622)). Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Jimeno never mentions the officer’s statement 
to seek a warrant if Jimeno refused to provide consent. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249-50.  
227. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 249-50.  
228. Id. at 250. 
229. Id. at 251.  
230. As Professor Stuntz has explained, if a genuine “reasonable person” standard was applied in 
Jimeno,   
it is hard to imagine anyone concluding that the search . . . was consensual. A uniformed, armed 
police officer had just stopped Jimeno’s car and told him he was suspected of drug trafficking. Not 
many people would say “no” to the police under those circumstances. After all, Jimeno was 
“consenting” to a search that he knew would uncover a kilogram of cocaine. Either he was crazy or, 
more plausibly, he assumed he had no choice. As the Court’s decision suggests, the real standard 
applied in cases of this sort is not the “reasonable person” test that courts cite but rather a kind of 
Jeopardy rule: if the officer puts his command in the form of a question, consent is deemed 
voluntary and the evidence comes in. 
Stuntz, supra note 226, at 1063-64 (footnote omitted).  
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Court approaches consent searches. One, despite what Justice Stewart said about 
the narrow scope of Bustamonte’s holding, the modern Court has extended that 
holding to contexts involving significantly greater degrees of police pressure than 
involved in Bustamonte. Two, the Court continues to adhere to Bustamonte’s 
unstated premise that a police request for consent indicates that the subject has 
the capacity to refuse. When the latter rule is combined with the fact that the 
Court no longer considers the subjective characteristics or intent of the defendant 
when deciding the validity of a challenged consent search, the upshot of the 
Court’s rulings is that unless a person can show some extraordinary circumstance 
surrounding their encounter with the police, consent will invariably be deemed 
valid, whether the target is subject to police custody or not. 
The lower courts have gotten the message and rarely consider subjective 
traits of the suspect when analyzing consent cases.231 As several legal scholars 
have acknowledged, “the subjectivity requirement of [Bustamonte] is dead.”232 
Rather than considering the subjective traits or state of mind of the person 
providing consent, the Court has openly moved to a “reasonableness” model that 
determines the validity of a consent search by simply asking whether the search 
was reasonable. And the “reasonableness” the Court’s has in mind is the 
objective conduct of the police. As Justice Scalia put it in Illinois v. Rodriguez, a 
 
231. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 222-27. Professor Strauss read every published consent search case, 
federal and state, over a three year period. She “discovered only a handful of cases—out of hundreds of 
decisions—in which the court analyzed the suspect’s particular subjective factors.” Id. at 222. This research 
lead to the conclusion “that consent searches are upheld except in extreme cases that almost always focus not on 
subjective factors of the suspect, but on the behavior of the police.” Id. at 227. See also Brian A. Sutherland, 
Note, Whether Consent to Search was Given Voluntarily: A Statistical Analysis of Factors That Predict the 
Suppression Rulings of the Federal District Courts, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2192 (2006). Sutherland found that the 
“factors associated with the individual traits and subjective state of mind of the defendant were seldom 
discussed in the trial court opinions and thus are poor predictors of the outcome of the suppression ruling.” Id. 
at 2195. Sutherland’s statistical analysis reached the conclusion that, although Bustamonte requires a totality of 
the circumstances approach to judging the voluntariness of consent, 
in practice courts will find consent voluntary in the absence of police misconduct. The statistical 
evidence . . . shows that factors related to police misconduct—such as illegal entries, illegal seizures, 
and threats—are correlated with courts’ final determinations of suppression motions. At the same 
time, acts that are considered coercive but may be necessary to police work—such as placing the 
suspect in some form of custody or unholstering firearms—lack meaningful correlation.  
Id. at 2225. 
232. Simmons, supra note 5, at 779; see also DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN 
THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 32-33 (1999) (describing a law student’s paper reviewing all cases 
involving consent searches decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit: 
“In most of the cases, the courts did not even discuss the subjective factors that [Bustamonte] said would be 
relevant in determining voluntariness”; rather than “focusing on the subjective characteristics of the defendant, 
courts generally focus on the conduct of the police.”); Strauss, supra note 4, at 221-22 (“Although the Supreme 
Court in [Bustamonte] suggested that a defendant could try to invalidate the consent to search based on 
numerous subjective factors relating to the suspect’s mental state or character, it is a rare case in which the court 
actually analyzes any of these factors. Even more rare is the case where the court finds them determinative and 
excludes the evidence.”); The Fourth Amendment and Antidilution, supra note 30, at 2193 (stating that lower 
courts have rejected “the subjective inquiry into an individual’s knowledge [of the right to refuse consent] and 
susceptibility to coercion”). 
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third-party consent case, what the Fourth Amendment assures “is not that no 
government search of [a person’s] house will occur unless he consents; but that 
no search will occur that is ‘unreasonable.’”233 
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSERTING FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS:  
UNITED STATES V. DRAYTON AND JUSTICE KENNEDY’S  
CONCEPTION OF A VALID CONSENT SEARCH 
The next important case that explains the modern Court’s approach to 
consent search cases is United States v. Drayton.234 Drayton held that police need 
not advise bus passengers of their right to refuse cooperation when seeking 
consent to search their possessions and bodies.235 In many ways, Drayton, 
decided in 2002, was a replay of Florida v. Bostick, which over a decade earlier 
adopted the constitutional rule that bus passengers feel free to terminate a police 
encounter when officers request to see their identification and seek consent to 
search their luggage.236 Bostick has been a much criticized opinion,237 but that 
criticism did not deter the Drayton majority from expanding the authority given 
the police in Bostick. The Bostick Court had only decided that a bus passenger 
had not been seized as a per se matter when police asked to see his ticket and 
identification, and requested consent to search his luggage after informing him of 
 
233. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990) (citation omitted); see Williams, supra note 5, at 74 
(persuasively explaining that the defendant in Rodriguez “never ‘voluntarily’ consent to the search [of his 
home] and never voluntarily authorized his former girlfriend to consent to a search”). In another part of his 
article, Professor Williams notes that Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), United States v. Mendenhall, and 
Drayton,  
show quite clearly . . . that the power to withhold consent is governed by objective considerations, 
particularly the observable conduct of the law-enforcement agents; the particulars of the search 
target’s mental and emotional states are irrelevant, except in the very limited sense that such 
particulars might bring a different shade to how the Court reacts to the events leading up to the act of 
consent. 
Id. at 86. Indeed, Professor Williams contends that the Court has always employed a reasonableness test for 
judging the constitutional validity of consent searches: 
What happened in Bustamonte and all of the other consent-search cases is what happened in 
Rodriquez: the Court evaluated a civilian-police encounter and inquired into whether the crime-
fighting methodology was minimally acceptable. The Court might dress up the analysis with 
evocative metaphysical notions, but only naïveté or the desire to erect a straw-man critique prevents 
one from seeing that the Court purports to do nothing more, and nothing less, than assess 
reasonableness. 
Id. at 92-93 (footnote omitted). 
234. 536 U.S. 194 (2002). 
235. Id. at 206-07. 
236. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
237. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, “Power, Not Reason”: Justice Marshall’s Valedictory and the Fourth 
Amendment in the Supreme Court’s 1990 Term, 70 N.C. L. REV. 373, 396-400 (1992); Wayne R. LaFave, 
Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey: Whence Fourth Amendment “Seizures”?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 
729, 745-53; Tracey Maclin, Justice Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
723, 800-12 (1992).  
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his right to refuse.238 Unlike Bostick, Drayton involved both whether the 
defendants had been seized and whether their consent to search their bags had 
been voluntarily obtained. 
The pertinent facts in Drayton were the following: After all the passengers 
had reboarded a bus during a scheduled stop, the driver left the bus and three 
police officers boarded the bus.239 One officer knelt on the driver’s seat; a second 
officer stood at the rear of the bus; and the third officer approached and 
questioned individual passengers about their travel plans, “sought to match 
passengers with luggage in the overhead racks,” and asked individual passengers 
for consent to search their luggage for narcotics and illegal weapons.240 This 
officer did not inform passengers of their right to refuse a consent search.241 
Writing for the majority in Drayton, Justice Kennedy ruled that the 
defendants, Drayton and Brown, companions on the bus, had not been seized 
when the officer questioned them about narcotics and illegal weapons while they 
were seated.242 Kennedy also held that the defendants validly consented to have 
their bodies searched, including the areas around their upper thighs, even though 
they were not informed of their right to refuse.243 Specifically, Drayton’s consent 
occurred after officers discovered narcotics on Brown and arrested him. The third 
officer then turned to Drayton and said, “Mind if I check you?”244 Without a 
verbal response, Drayton lifted his hands above his legs, which allowed the 
officer to pat down his legs and detect narcotics concealed underneath his pants 
near his upper thigh.245 
In a crucial passage, Justice Kennedy explained the Court’s current 
understanding of consent under the Fourth Amendment: 
In a society based on law, the concept of agreement and consent should 
 
238. See id. at 431-32, 437-40. 
239. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 197 (2002). 
240. Id. at 197-99. 
241. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 198. As Professor Nadler observed, “the officers had essentially 
commandeered the bus. From the passengers’ perspective, the message was clear that the bus was going 
nowhere until the officers were satisfied that they had received cooperation.” Nadler, supra note 14, at 177. 
242. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 203-06. 
243. Id. at 206-07. 
244. Id. at 199. 
245. Id. As noted in the text, when Drayton came to the Court, it involved two separate issues—whether 
the defendants had been seized and whether their consent was voluntary—which, prior to Drayton, required the 
consideration of two separate legal standards. To resolve the seizure issue, the applicable legal test asked 
whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave or terminate the encounter with the police. To resolve 
the consent issue, Bustamonte’s voluntariness test was the applicable legal test. As Professor Nadler explains,  
in Drayton the Court implicitly adopted the same ‘free to refuse/terminate’ test for deciding 
voluntariness of consent to search that has been used since Bostick for deciding the seizure question. 
These two questions—seizure and voluntariness of search—have essentially merged in Bostick and 
Drayton. The [Bustamonte] Court’s emphasis on balancing order and liberty has receded into the 
background. The test is now stated in much more definite terms: free to refuse or terminate.  
Nadler, supra note 14, at 162. 
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be given a weight and dignity of its own. Police officers act in full accord 
with the law when they ask citizens for consent. It reinforces the rule of 
law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes and for the 
police to act in reliance on that understanding. When this exchange takes 
place, it dispels inferences of coercion.246 
This cryptic passage speaks volumes about the Court’s view of consent 
searches. Without expressly saying so, Justice Kennedy embraced Bustamonte’s 
premise that when police request consent to search, the request itself carries the 
implication that an alternative of refusal exists. Put another way, when police ask 
for consent, citizens understand that they have the right to refuse. And if they do 
not want to be searched, it is their responsibility to know and assert their rights 
and tell the police to leave them alone.247 
What supports my analysis of this passage? Consider Justice Kennedy’s 
comments and questions during oral argument in Drayton: First, Kennedy asked 
the government’s lawyer, Deputy Solicitor General Larry Thompson, 
Would it be appropriate in your view for this Court to write an opinion in 
which we say that citizens have certain obligations to know their rights 
and to assert their rights? That’s what makes for a strong democracy . . . 
And people have a certain obligation to assert their rights. If they don’t 
want to be searched, they say I don’t want to be searched. Should we 
write that in an opinion?248 
When questioning counsel for the defendants, Kennedy asked: “An 
American citizen has to protect his rights once in a while. That’s—that’s a very 
bad thing?”249 After defense counsel responded that requiring the citizen to assert 
his rights improperly shifts the burden from the government to prove that the 
encounter is consensual and that the consent given is voluntary, Kennedy replied:  
The question is whether or not the Government also has the burden to 
educate citizens as to their rights in every encounter, whether or not there 
isn’t some obligation on the part of the citizen to know and to exercise 
his rights or her rights.250  
Finally, after complaining about the fact-specific nature of the defendants’ 
 
246. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207 (emphasis added). 
247. Professor Nadler has read this passage in a slightly different manner. She comments that Drayton 
“decided, seemingly as a matter of law, that when a police officer asks a citizen for consent to search, and the 
citizen responds positively, such consent is voluntary. ‘When this exchange takes place, it dispels inferences of 
coercion.’” Nadler, supra note 14, at 179 (quoting Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207). 
248. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002) (No. 01-631).  
249. Id. at 34. 
250. Id. at 35. 
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analysis of Fourth Amendment law, Justice Kennedy observed to defense 
counsel: 
It—it seems to me this world you’re creating for us is—is not strong for 
the Constitution. It seems to me a strong world is when officers respect 
people’s rights and—and people know what their rights are and—and 
assert their rights. [And say to the police,] I don’t want to be 
searched. . . . I don’t want to be searched. Leave me alone.251 
After the oral argument, when it came time to write the opinion in Drayton, 
Justice Kennedy concluded that “[i]t reinforces the rule of law” for the police to 
ask for consent and “for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes.”252 
When this exchange occurs, Kennedy held—in what appeared to be a per se 
rule—there is no coercion and the consent is valid as a matter of law.253 It is 
constitutionally irrelevant to Justice Kennedy and the rest of the Drayton 
majority that the police do not advise citizens of their right to say “no” and never 
tell citizens that if they says “no,” the police will respect that refusal. 
Furthermore, Kennedy’s analysis assumes that police will respect a person’s 
refusal to cooperate in these circumstances, move on to another passenger when 
they encounter resistance to their request, and not continue questioning or 
otherwise seek to change the person’s mind about cooperating with the police. 
And finally, Justice Kennedy’s analysis also assumes that the typical bus 
passenger knows that police will respect and yield to his refusal to cooperate, and 
that the typical passenger will not think that unless they cooperate with the police 
negative consequences may come their way. 
Of course, Justice Kennedy’s conclusions regarding the legal expertise and 
ability of bus passengers to know and assert their Fourth Amendment rights when 
confronted by armed police officers in the narrow confines of a bus are not based 
on any empirical data. One could say, as Professor Nadler comments, that 
Kennedy’s conclusions are “only intuitive reflections on [his and the other 
Justices’] own experience and about the imagined experience of other 
citizens.”254 Whether this is true or not, I do not know. But I do agree with 
 
251. Id. at 44. 
252. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207. 
253. See Nadler, supra note 14, at 179. 
254. Id. at 165. My understanding of how people, particularly poor and black, react to a police “request” 
was confirmed by a recent article in the New York Times. See Solomon Moore, Reporting While Black, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, § 4. In that article, a black reporter for the New York Times describes what happened to 
him while he is talking at midnight with about a dozen other black men on a street in Salisbury, North 
Caroliana. Three police vehicles appear on the scene. The officers exited their vehicles and the reporter was 
ordered toward a tall white officer. Without a question from the officer, or provocation from the men, the 
reporter’s face is shoved down on a police cruiser and the reporter is handcuffed “so tightly that [his] fingertips 
tingled.”  Id.  The police search the reporter’s wallet, discover his corporation identification card and learn that 
there are no outstanding warrants for the reporter’s arrest. Eventually, “the handcuffs were unlocked and [the] 
wallet returned without apology or explanation beyond [the police] implication that [someone] approaching 
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Professor Nadler’s general observation that the “unstated concern” in Drayton is 
“that the police be permitted to engage in suspicionless seizures and consentless 
searches so long as they avoid abusive or overly coercive tactics.”255 In the final 
analysis, “Drayton is at bottom based on a judgment about the reasonableness of 
police conduct under the circumstances,”256 and there is no reference to, let alone 
consideration of, “the [subjective] characteristics of the accused,”257 as required 
by Bustamonte’s totality test. Instead, Justice Kennedy explained that the consent 
was voluntary because when the officer requested permission to search the 
defendants’ persons, “he asked first if they objected, thus indicating to a 
reasonable person that he or she was free to refuse.”258 
V. GEORGIA V. RANDOLPH: THE GOOD NEWS ABOUT CONSENT SEARCHES? 
This article is entitled, “The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches in 
the Supreme Court.” So far, my analysis has highlighted the bad aspects of the 
Court’s consent search jurisprudence—at least from a civil libertarian’s 
perspective. (From a police perspective, the above discussion must sound pretty 
good.) If you have read this far, you may be wondering when I will get to the 
good news. That is where Georgia v. Randolph  comes in. 
Randolph involved a typical fact scenario: Randolph’s wife called the police 
during a domestic dispute with her husband.259 When the police arrived, the wife 
told them Randolph used cocaine.260 Randolph, a lawyer, denied the accusation 
but refused to allow the police to search the marital home.261 The police then 
asked and obtained permission from the wife to search the home.262 It goes 
without saying that drugs were found and Randolph was charged with drug 
possession. The trial court denied Randolph’s motion to exclude the drugs, but 
the Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed because it found that the search of 
 
young black men on a public sidewalk was somehow flouting the law.” Id.  The reporter angrily protested to the 
police that “‘This is America,’’’ and informed them that he had “‘a right to talk to anyone I like, wherever I 
like.’” Id. Needless to say, none of those protests persuaded the police that they had done anything illegal or 
wrong. After the police left, one of the black men told the reporter: “Man, you know what would have happened 
to one of us if we talked to them that way? . . . We’d be in jail right now.” Id. This man’s comment epitomizes 
my understanding of why many people cooperate with police “requests”–the fear of police reprisal if they don’t. 
Cf. Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1014 (2002) (arguing that a 
racial minority’s refusal to agree to a consent search “can racially aggravate or intensify [a police] encounter, 
increasing the person of color’s vulnerability to physical violence, arrest, or both”). 
255. Id. at 163. 
256. Id.; see also Simmons, supra note 5, at 780 (explaining that Drayton “applied a purely objective 
test”). 
257. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973). 
258. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206 (2002) (emphasis added). 
259. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 107 (2006). 
260. Id. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
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Randolph’s home violated the Fourth Amendment.263 The Georgia Supreme 
Court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling, concluding that “the consent to 
conduct a warrantless search of a residence given by one occupant is not valid in 
the face of the refusal of another occupant who is physically present at the scene 
to permit a warrantless search.”264 
Counsel for Randolph faced a difficult task when the Court decided to review 
his client’s case. Every federal appellate court and all but two state courts had 
ruled against defendants raising similar Fourth Amendment claims.265 The reason 
why was simple enough. In two previous rulings, the Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment permits a warrantless search of a home when police obtain the 
consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority 
over the premises in common with the target of the search. In the first case, noted 
earlier, United States v. Matlock upheld a search of Matlock’s bedroom after the 
police obtained consent from Matlock’s live-in girlfriend while Matlock was 
conveniently seated in a police cruiser parked at the curb, handcuffed, and under 
arrest.266 Matlock upheld third-party consent searches on two independent 
grounds. One, the third party could authorize the search “in his [or her] own 
right.”267 The second basis was that the defendant had “assumed the risk” that a 
joint occupant would allow the search.268 
The second ruling that posed problems for Randolph was Illinois v. 
Rodriguez.269 In Rodriguez, a woman, Gail Fischer, summoned the police to her 
mother’s home after she claimed that Rodriguez had assaulted her.270 Fischer led 
the police to Rodriguez’s home and opened the door with a key she possessed.271 
Rodriguez was unaware of the police entry because he was upstairs asleep.272 
Police found narcotics inside the home and arrested Rodriguez. It was later 
determined that Fischer had not lived in the apartment for several weeks and that 
she had no legal authority to consent to an entry.273 That fact did not bother the 
Court. Writing for a majority of six Justices that included Justice Kennedy, 
Justice Scalia reversed the state court ruling, which had held that the search 
 
263. See Randolph v. State, 590 S.E.2d 834 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003). 
264. State v. Randolph, 604 S.E.2d 835, 836 (Ga. 2004). 
265. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 108-09 n.1. In addition to the Georgia’s Supreme Court’s holding in 
Randolph, only Wisconsin required all present co-occupants’ consent for a valid search. See State v. Leach, 782 
P.2d 1035, 1040 (1989) (explaining that police may rely upon a third party’s consent to search premises; 
“[h]owever, should the cohabitant be present and able to object [to the police entry], the police must also obtain 
the cohabitant’s consent”). 
266. Id. at 166-67, 169, 179. 
267. Id. at 171 n.7. 
268. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7. 
269. 497 U.S. 177 (1990). 
270. Id. at 179. 
271. Id. at 179-80. 
272. See id. 
273. Id. 
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violated Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment rights.274 
Relying on a “reasonableness” model, Scalia explained that a warrantless 
search is valid when based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at 
the time of the entry, reasonably believe possesses common authority over the 
premises, but who in fact lacks lawful authority to allow a search.275 According 
to Scalia, the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement does not demand 
that the police always be correct in their factual determinations, but rather that 
they always be reasonable.276 Thus, Justice Scalia remanded the case to the 
Illinois courts to determine whether the officers reasonably believed that Fischer 
had the authority to consent to a search of Rodriguez’ home.277 
When Randolph’s case arrived at the Court, the only difference between his 
case and Matlock and Rodriguez was that Randolph had denied police consent to 
enter. But that fact hardly provided a principled basis to distinguish Matlock and 
Rodriguez. 
As the deputy solicitor general noted during oral argument, it would be very 
odd to say that Matlock relinquished his rights when he was arrested, taken to a 
police car, and never asked for consent, or that Rodriguez relinquished his right 
by falling asleep in his own home.278 Indeed, Justice Souter accurately captured 
the essence of the government’s claim when he told counsel for Randolph that  
[i]t is clear that Matlock, had he known what was going on . . . would 
have objected [to the search]. [Thus], if we accept your argument that the 
presence of the person there expressing an objection is what makes the 
difference, then Matlock and Rodriguez become almost silly cases. They 
are . . . cases that rest upon an assumption that is clearly contrary to 
fact.279  
When viewed from this perspective, Randolph’s claim was based not on a 
principled notion of privacy but rather, as Chief Justice Roberts would later 
explain in his dissent, on the good luck or happenstance of a home owner who 
 
274. Id. at 180, 189. 
275.  Id. at 186, 188. 
276.  Id. at 186. 
277.  Id. at 189-90. 
278. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-28, Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (No. 04-1067): 
JUSTICE O’CONNOR: . . . If the co-inhabitant is not there, he relinquishes whatever right he had to 
object. But if the co-inhabitant is there, and says no, what’s the matter with giving effect to that? 
MR. DREEBEN: I think it’s very odd to say that, in Matlock, the right was relinquished, when 
 Matlock was arrested and taken to a police car and was never asked for consent, or that Rodriguez 
 relinquished his right by falling asleep in his own apartment. . . . [Randolph’s argument] would  treat 
her consent as 100 percent valid when he’s asleep or absent, no matter how much we know  he would 
object, and it would treat it as zero when he’s on the scene and vocalizes an objection.  And I think 
that that would protect Fourth Amendment rights only by happenstance . . . . 
279. Id. at 46-47. 
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just happens to be present and objects to a search when the police arrive.280 
Despite the common sense basis of the government’s position, Randolph 
earned the magic number in the Supreme Court—five. In a fact-specific ruling, 
five justices held that a “warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence 
over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident cannot be 
justified as reasonable as to him on the basis of consent given to the police by 
another resident.”281 Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Thomas 
dissented.282 (Justice Alito did not participate in the decision.) 
What explains the result in Randolph, particularly in light of the Court’s 
earlier rulings in Matlock and Rodriguez? First, I think, Justice Souter’s opinion 
for the Court in Randolph is a determined effort to provide a new mode of 
thinking about consent searches. In recent years, Justice Souter has occasionally 
shown a willingness to devise new approaches to Fourth Amendment issues and 
forgo conventional forms of analysis where he believes that such analysis is 
mistaken. For example, in a little noticed dissent in Illinois v. Caballes, Justice 
Souter urged the Court to discard its traditional view that a dog-sniff is not a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.283 Similarly, in his dissent 
in Drayton he remarked there was “an air of unreality about the Court’s 
explanation that bus passengers consent to searches of their luggage to enhance 
their own safety and the safety of [other passengers].”284 And he directly 
challenged the legal fiction that bus passengers would reasonably feel free to 
ignore or resist police questioning or think that they had nothing to lose if they 
refused to cooperate with the police.285 
In Randolph, Justice Souter seems to have concluded that “assumption of 
risk” theory—which had been the controlling legal model for resolving third-
party consent search cases—was an unprincipled norm for resolving the difficult 
constitutional issues presented in Randolph. As mentioned earlier, when risk 
analysis is applied to the facts in Randolph, two pointed issues are left 
unanswered. First, “why is it (and when is it) that A’s ‘own right’ to permit a 
search must prevail over B’s right of privacy in those premises?”286 Second, “to 
what extent may it truly be said that B’s expectation of privacy in a certain place 
 
280. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 137 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]hat the rule is so 
random in its application confirms that it bears no real relation to the privacy protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. What the majority’s rule protects is not so much privacy as the good luck of a co-owner who just 
happens to be present at the door when the police arrive.”). 
281. Id. at 120 (emphasis added). 
282. Id. at 127 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); Id. at 142 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 145 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  
283. Illinois v. Cabballes, 543 U.S. 405, 411-14 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he government’s use 
of a trained narcotics dog functions as a limited search to reveal undisclosed facts about private enclosures, to 
be used to justified a further and complete search of the enclosed area. And given the fallibility of the dog, the 
sniff is the first step in a process that may disclose ‘intimate details’ without revealing contraband . . . .”). 
284. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 208 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quotations omitted). 
285. Id. at 212. 
286. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.3(a), at 149. 
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has been destroyed simply because A enjoys equal property rights in that 
place?”287 (Of course, if you resolve these questions in favor of B, a third 
question surfaces: If A wants to admit the police, why does B have more of a 
right to keep the police out than B has to admit them?)288 For Chief Justice 
Roberts, these questions were not difficult: According to the Chief Justice, the 
Court’s precedents made plain that whenever we share space with another 
person, we assume the risk that the other person might consent to a search of the 
shared area.289 Justice Souter rejected that answer because it undermined the 
centuries of special protection for the privacy of the home.290 
Rather than rely on “assumption of risk” analysis, Justice Souter looked to 
what he called “widely shared social expectations, which are naturally enough 
influenced by the law of property, but not controlled by its rules.”291 When 
common societal expectations were considered, Souter concluded there was no 
norm that recognized that a co-occupant has a right or authority to prevail over 
the wishes of another occupant who objects to inviting outsiders into their 
home.292 Because there is “no common understanding that one co-tenant 
generally has a right or authority to prevail over the express wishes of another,” 
the co-tenant’s decision to allow police access “adds nothing” to the 
government’s side of the balancing scale for determining the reasonableness of a 
police search.293 On the opposite side is the “centuries-old principle of respect for 
the privacy of the home.”294 In the final analysis, Justice Souter concluded that 
the balancing process tilted in favor of Randolph because disputed permission for 
a police entry is no match against the special protection afforded the privacy of 
the home.295 
 
287. Id.. 
288. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (No. 04-1067). 
289. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 128 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“If an individual shares information, papers, 
or places with another, he assumes the risk that the other person will in turn share access to that information or 
those papers or places with the government. And just as an individual who has shared illegal plans or 
incriminating documents with another cannot interpose an objection when that other person turns the 
information over to the government, just because the individual happens to be present at the time, so too 
someone who shares a place with another cannot interpose an objection when that person decides to grant 
access to the police, simply because the objecting individual happens to be present.”).  
290. Id. at 115 & n.4 (majority opinion). 
291. Id. at 111 (citation omitted). 
292. Id. at 114. 
293. Id. at 114-15. 
294. Id. at 115 (quotations and citation omitted). 
295. Id. at 115-16 (“Disputed permission is thus no match for [the special protection for the privacy of 
the home under] the Fourth Amendment, and the State’s other countervailing claims do not add up to outweigh 
it.”). Justice Souter emphasized that the result in Randolph had “no bearing on the capacity of the police to 
protect domestic [violence] victims.” Id. at 118. Souter then asserted what appeared to be new legal authority 
for the police to enter a private dwelling:  
No question has been raised, or reasonably could be, about the authority of the police to enter a 
dwelling to protect a resident from domestic violence; so long as they have good reason to believe 
such a threat exists, it would be silly to suggest that the police would commit a tort by entering, say, 
to give a complaining tenant the opportunity to collect belongings and get out safely, or to determine 
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Before describing the second, and I believe more interesting, reason for the 
result in Randolph, a few things should be said about the majority’s opinion. 
Although I applaud Justice Souter’s determination to find a principled mode of 
analysis for analyzing third-party consent searches, I doubt that the social 
expectations concept will be applied in a principled manner or will offer 
meaningful protection to Fourth Amendment interests in future cases. Fourth 
Amendment scholars across the political spectrum agree that the expectations of 
privacy model has not generated principled results when it has been used to 
determine whether police activity constitutes a search or whether a person has 
standing to challenge a search.296 And although a majority of the Court has not 
 
whether violence (or threat of violence) has just occurred or is about to (or soon will) occur, however 
much a spouse or other co-tenant objected.  
Id. at 118 (emphasis added). Professor Craig Bradley contends that this statement is a new rule created by the 
majority concerning the authority of the police to enter a home to protect the safety of another person. 
According to Bradley: 
This is a new rule, but a sensible one. The Court has never addressed the issue of what standard of 
proof is required to enter a dwelling or other structure to protect an occupant from violence. In 
general, exigent circumstance entries, to catch a fleeing felon or to protect evidence from 
destruction, require probable cause. But surely the Court is correct to apply the more lenient Terry-
type standard of evidence when the police are acting to protect themselves or others, though it 
announces this new rule in a very off-handed way.  
CRAIG BRADLEY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RECENT CASES ANALYZED 82-83 (2007) (citations omitted). Whether 
or not Justice Souter intended to announce a new, expansive authority for the police to enter private homes, he 
does clearly state that the right of the police to enter a home to protect a domestic violent victim “has nothing to 
do with the question in this case, whether a search with the consent of one co-tenant is good against another, 
standing at the door and expressly refusing consent.” Randolph, 547 U.S. at 119. 
296. Legal scholarship criticizing Katz’s expectation of privacy test is pervasive. See, e.g., Thomas K. 
Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
307, 339 (1998) (“[T]he “Court’s expectation of privacy analysis has many flaws. It has no textual support in 
the language of the amendment. It accordingly leaves the fluid concept of privacy to the vagaries of shifting 
Court majorities, which are able to manipulate the concept to either expand or contract the meaning of the word 
at will.”) (footnotes omitted); Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment 
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 252-53 (1993) (stating that the expectations of privacy analysis “has produced 
only an amorphous formula that allows the Justices to treat the fourth amendment as an instrument for 
achieving social goals approved by shifting majorities on the Court”); Sherry F. Colb, What is a Search? Two 
Conceptual Flaws in Fourth Amendment Doctrine and Some Hints of a Remedy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 119 (2002) 
(identifying the two implicit “moves” inherent in the expectations of privacy test); Christopher Slobogin & 
Joseph E. Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An 
Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society”, 42 DUKE L.J. 727, 774 (1993) 
(tentative empirical research indicates that the Court’s “conclusions about the scope of the Fourth Amendment 
are often not in tune with commonly held attitudes about police investigative techniques”). In a recent article, 
Professor David Sklansky has observed that “[a]mong scholars Katz is widely viewed as something of a 
failure.” David Alan Sklansky, “One Train May Hide Another”: Katz, Stonewall, and the Secret Subtext of 
Criminal Procedure, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 6, on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review); see also Clancy, supra, at 339 n.234 (listing legal scholarship criticizing Katz). Professor 
Sklansky best summarizes the failure of the expectations of privacy concept: 
At best, the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test has seemed fraudulent —a flashy, modern-
sounding way to dress up results that are really driven by the property-based reasoning set forth in 
Olmstead [v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)] and nominally rejected in Katz.  At worst, Katz 
traded the relatively firm footholds of the Olmstead test for a loosey-goosey, unreliable focus on 
expectations of privacy that “society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’” Indeed to many 
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deemed the social expectations concept a failure, one case, Minnesota v. 
Carter,297 illustrates that expectations theory often produces confusing law and 
scant protection for individual privacy. 
The central issue in Carter was whether social guests have expectations of 
privacy while staying in their host’s apartment.298  A majority of the Justices held 
that the defendants did not have an expectation of privacy; thus an officer’s 
viewing of the defendants engaging in illegal activity through a drawn window 
blind did not violate the Fourth Amendment.299 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion 
explained that “an overnight guest in a home may claim the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment, but one who is merely present with the consent of the 
householder may not.”300 According to the Chief Justice, the defendants in Carter 
were “obviously somewhere in between” these two poles.301 Ultimately, 
Rehnquist found that the defendants in Carter were not entitled to constitutional 
protection because they were present in the home for only a few hours to conduct 
a business transaction, they had no previous relationship with the host, and no 
facts suggested “a degree of acceptance into the household” similar to the 
situation involving an overnight guest.302 
Interestingly, Justice Kennedy, who provided the crucial fifth vote in Carter, 
stated that he joined the plurality’s opinion because its reasoning was consistent 
with his “view that almost all social guests have a legitimate expectation of 
privacy.”303 Yet there was nothing in the Chief Justice’s opinion supporting the 
claim that “almost all social guests” have a legitimate expectation of privacy 
while in the home of a third party. Furthermore, Kennedy also asserted that 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent “must be correct that reasonable expectations of the 
owner are shared, to some extent, by the guest,” which meant, according to 
Kennedy, that, “as a general rule, social guests will have an expectation of 
privacy in their host’s home.”304 Notwithstanding these statements, Kennedy 
concluded that the defendants in Carter were not entitled to constitutional 
protection.305 Unfortunately, neither Justice Kennedy’s concurrence nor any of 
 
observers, on and off the Court, the Katz test has come to seem wholly circular: an expectation of 
privacy is reasonable if the Court is willing to protect it. 
Sklansky, supra, at 6 (footnotes omitted). 
297. 525 U.S. 83 (1998). Speaking for himself and Justice Thomas, Justice Scalia has reached this 
conclusion. See id at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling the expectations of privacy rule a “self-indulgent test” 
that has “no plausible foundation in the text of the Fourth Amendment”). 
298. See id. at 83 (majority opinion). 
299. Id. at 85, 91. 
300. Id. at 90. 
301. Id. at 91. 
302. Id. at 90-91. 
303. Id. at 99 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
304. Id. at 101-02. 
305. Justice Kennedy explained that the defendants had a “fleeting and insubstantial connection” to the 
host’s home because they used the home simply as a convenient processing station, there was no evidence that 
they had engaged in confidential communications with the host or had been at the home previously, they left 
2007 / The Good and Bad News About Consent Searches 
 
48 
the other opinions in Carter explain what facts a social guest or visitor must 
prove to show that he is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection when in the 
home of his host. 
If the result and reasoning of Carter is an indication of the how the Court 
will apply social expectations theory to future third-party consent search cases, 
we should not expect principled results. Randolph’s holding will probably be 
confined to its unique facts, and in future cases the Court will rule that the social 
expectations that protected Randolph’s home will not protect his car or luggage. 
Already, there is evidence that the Randolph majority is uncomfortable with 
Randolph’s alignment with prior cases. The Court admits that it is “drawing a 
fine line” between the result in Randolph and the results in Matlock and 
Rodriguez but insists that the “formalism is justified.”306 But why is the 
formalism justified? The fine line drawing and formalism cannot be justified 
because of “the centuries of special protection for the privacy of the home.”307 
Weren’t the homes of Matlock and Rodriguez also entitled to “the centuries of 
special protection for the privacy of the home”? The fine line drawing and 
formalism cannot be justified to provide clarity for the police. Wasn’t there an 
easily administered rule available for Matlock and Rodriguez? Justice Souter 
suggested one during oral argument: “the only consent that will suffice will be 
the consent of the person against whom you expect to use any evidence 
found.”308 As Souter observed, this too is an “[e]asy clear line.”309 Finally, if the 
formalism is justified only because Randolph was present and objected to the 
search, then Chief Justice Roberts is right to criticize the result in Randolph as 
unprincipled.310 
In light of these considerations, Randolph’s protection will probably extend 
only to the few individuals lucky enough to be present when the police arrive at 
their homes and knowledgeable enough to refuse when police seek permission to 
enter their homes.311 Of course, police officers will also know how to evade 
 
before their arrest, and the lower court had found that they could not be characterized as the host’s “guests.” Id. 
at 102. 
306. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 121 (2006). 
307.  See id. at 115 n.4. 
308. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 47-48, Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (No. 04-1067). Of 
course, another easily administered rule could have been applied in Matlock and Rodriguez, namely, because 
the police lacked a search warrant and because there were no exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless 
entry, the search was illegal because the consent of a third party provides a “wholly inadequate substitute for the 
protections which inhere in a judicially granted warrant.” United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 187 (1974) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
309. Transcript of Oral Argument, at 48, Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (No. 04-1067). 
310. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 136-37 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“What the majority’s rule protects is not 
so much privacy as the good luck of a co-owner who just happens to be present at the door when the police 
arrive. . . . We should not embrace a rule at the outset that its sponsors appreciate will result in drawing fine, 
formalistic lines.”). Professor LaFave rightly notes that the dissenters’ criticism “loses some of its bite when it 
is considered that those dissenters were not arguing for a broader rule, but rather for no rule at all beyond that in 
Matlock.” LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.3, at 20 (Supp. 2007). 
311. Some academic commentators see Randolph as an extremely narrow holding. See, e.g., BRADLEY, 
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Randolph’s protections. In a post-Randolph world, an absent suspect’s refusal to 
give consent will not be the final word when the police can obtain the consent of 
the suspect’s co-occupant.312 And if necessary, the police can always remove or 
arrest a suspect before seeking the co-occupant’s consent. To be sure, Justice 
Souter indicated that efforts to avoid Randolph’s holding might invalidate an 
otherwise proper third-party consent if there is “evidence that the police have 
removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance for the sake of 
avoiding a possible objection.”313 But even this exception provides marginal 
 
supra note 295, at 81 (explaining that the Randolph majority “went out of its way to stress the narrowness of its 
opinion” and Justice Breyer repeated those points in his concurrance); David A. Moran, The End of the 
Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The Roberts Court Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2006 CATO SUP. 
CT. REV. 283, 291-93 (noting that Randolph is “far too fact-bound and narrow to count as a truly important 
Fourth Amendment case”  and will apply to “only a tiny handful of cases every year”); Andrew Fiske, 
Disputed-Consent Searches: An Uncharacteristic Step Toward Reinforcing Defendants’ Privacy Rights, 84 
DENV. U. L. REV. 721, 736 (2006) (same). Similarly, some courts see Randolph’s holding as narrow. See, e.g., 
Donald v. State, 903 A.2d 315 (Del. 2006). In Donald, police arrested the defendant’s boyfriend whose 
probation required that he summit to warrantless searches of his home. Id. at 317-18. Police then went to the 
home shared by defendant and her boyfriend and announced they were conducting an administrative search of 
the home. Id. at 318. The defendant did not object to the search, which revealed illegal narcotics and drug 
paraphernalia. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the search and explained that Randolph supported its 
ruling. According to the court, under Randolph, “police are not required to take affirmative steps to seek 
consent from a potentially objecting co-tenant, even when present.” Id. at 321. Here, the defendant “could have 
prevented the search of her home without a warrant by expressly objecting to it,” but “[s]he did not.” Id. 
 Notwithstanding cases like Donald, Professor Burkoff believes that Randolph’s social expectation theory 
has a greater potential to impact consent search law. See Burkoff, supra note 5, at 1131-32, 1135-40. According 
to Professor Burkoff, Randolph’s logic extends beyond third-party consent searches and even overrules 
Bustamonte’s conclusion that the community’s generalized interest in effective law enforcement outweighs the 
individual’s interest in being informed of his right to refuse a police request for a consent search. See id at 1139. 
Specifically, Burkoff states that “although the [Bustamonte] majority expressly held to the contrary, it would 
appear [after Randolph] that, at the very least, our shared social expectations would be–our common sense 
would tell us–that one needs to be aware of the existence of the important constitutional right not to accede to a 
request to be searched by a police officer before one can surrender it.” Id. While I certainly agree with Professor 
Burkoff’s view that common sense dictates that most people need to be informed of their right to refuse a police 
request for a consent search to be deemed constitutional, for the reasons stated in the text of this article, I doubt 
that Randolph’s social expectations concept will mandate a change in the law of consent searches.  
312. See, e.g., United States v. Reed, No. 3:06-CR-75 RM, 2006 WL 2252515, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 3, 
2006) (stating that, although defendant refused to provide consent to search his residence while under arrest at 
the police station, police went to his home and obtained consent to search the home from his girlfriend who 
lived with the defendant). The search of the home was valid under Randolph because the defendant “wasn’t 
present at the house to deny the police permission to enter.” Id. at *10. One commentator disagrees with this 
narrow reading of Randolph. See Renee E. Williams, Note, Third Party Consent Searches After Georgia v. 
Randolph: Dueling Approaches to the Dueling Roommates, 87 B.U. L. REV. 937 (2007). Indeed, this 
commentator, like Professor Burkoff, believes that Randolph “signal[s] a potential change in the direction of 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in favor of giving more protection to defendants’ privacy rights.” Id. at 952. 
In a thoughful analysis of Randolph and the lower court cases decided in its wake, Williams contends: 
 Matlock, Rodriguez, and Randolph can all be reconciled under [the social expectations] principle, as it 
 simply can not be objectively reasonable under any societal understanding to enter shared premises based 
 on the consent of one co-occupant when the police officer knows that another co-occupant has expressly 
 refused to give consent. The physical presence of the objecting co-occupant has no substantial bearing on 
 the interests that the social expectations test is meant to protect, and thus the broad view of Randolph 
 represents the correct approach to the dueling roommate situation.” Id. at 967-68. 
313. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121. 
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security to someone who would object to a police search of his home. The 
protection granted in this exception “does not cover a case like Matlock where 
the potential objector was removed from the premises but not ‘from the 
entrance.’”314 The nuance in this caveat will escape most police officers, and, 
perhaps, a few judges. Finally, even if a judge is willing to consider the motives 
behind a police decision to remove a suspect from the scene (of course, cases like 
Whren v. United States315 instruct judges that the subjective motivations of the 
police are rarely relevant to Fourth Amendment issues), the judge will then be 
confronted with a series of questions that are likely to be resolved in favor of the 
police.316 
The above analysis suggests that the good news that Randolph proclaims 
about third-party consent searches is not likely to last very long. At the same 
time, there is another feature of Randolph that may prove more enduring than the 
social expectations concept that provides the nominal foundation for the ruling. 
The second, and more important, explanation for the result in Randolph is Justice 
Kennedy’s vote. At first glance, Kennedy’s decision to join Justice Souter’s 
opinion is perplexing. After all, Kennedy joined the Rodriguez majority, 
approving a third-party consent search in a context where the third party lacked 
the legal authority to allow a search. By contrast, in Randolph, the wife clearly 
possessed the legal right to authorize a police entry into the marital home. And 
when the reasonableness model announced in Rodriguez is applied to the facts in 
Randolph, it is obvious that the police acted properly (and “reasonably”) when 
they relied upon the wife’s authority to enter the home. Moreover, and generally 
speaking, Justice Kennedy has not been a strong advocate for Fourth Amendment 
rights. Even in cases where Kennedy ends up agreeing with arguments proposed 
by the defense, as he did in Minnesota v. Carter,317 Justice Kennedy usually finds 
a way to vote in favor of the government, as he also did in Carter. 
In any event, Kennedy’s vote in Randolph was extremely important.318 
Kennedy provided the fifth, and probably decisive, vote by joining the so-called 
 
314. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.3, at 20 (Supp. 2007) (emphasis added). 
315. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
316. For example, Randolph is critical of removing the suspect “for the sake of avoiding a possible 
objection,” Randolph, 547 U.S. at 121, which suggests that removing or arresting the suspect for questioning or 
some other reason like safety, or simply arresting and removing the suspect because the police have probable 
cause, is permissible and does not invalidate a subsequent consent provided by a third party. Furthermore, even 
in cases where the defendant proves he was removed “for the sake of avoiding a possible objection,” a judge 
must still decide whether the bad-faith of the police “automatically nullif[ies] the consent of the third party, or 
must some judgment [be] made about whether the removed defendant would otherwise have objected” to the 
subsequent search. LAFAVE, supra note 15, § 8.3, at 21 (Supp. 2007). 
317.  See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99-103 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
318. In the October Term 2005, the Term in which Randolph was decided, Justice Kennedy was in the 
majority on nine of the twelve 5-4 split decisions. See Statistics for the Supreme Court’s October Term 2005, 75 
U.S.L.WK. 3029, 3029 (July 18, 2006). The importance of Justice Kennedy’s vote in 5-4 rulings was more 
evident in the next Term. See Statistics for the Supreme Court’s October Term 2006, 76 U.S.L.WK. 3052, 3052 
(Aug. 7, 2007) (reporting that in the October Term 2006, Justice Kennedy “voted with the majority in all 24 of 
the Court’s 5-4 decisions”). 
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“liberal” justices. Had he voted with the conservative justices, as he normally 
does, the Court would have split 4-4. Or, had he joined the conservatives, he 
might have convinced Justice Breyer to go along with him to form a majority 
voting for the government, as occurred in Drayton, where Breyer abandoned the 
liberals and voted with the conservatives to rule that the defendants had validly 
consented to the searches in that case.319 
I suspect that agreement with Justice Souter’s social expectations concept 
was not the motivating force behind Justice Kennedy’s vote in Randolph. The 
basis for Kennedy’s vote, although unacknowledged, is more clear-cut. Recall 
Justice Kennedy’s comments during the oral argument in Drayton. There, he 
emphasized that “citizens have certain obligations to know their rights and to 
assert their rights[.] . . .  That’s what makes for a strong democracy. The law lives 
in the consciousness of the people. And people have a certain obligation to assert 
their rights.320 And recall Kennedy’s other remark that “It seems to me a strong 
world is when officers respect people’s rights and—and people know what their 
rights are and—and assert their rights [and say to the police] I don’t want to be 
searched. . . . I don’t want to be searched. Leave me alone.”321 
Well, Randolph not only knew his rights, he expressly asserted his rights by 
refusing police access to his home. Moreover, the police did not respect his 
assertion. Instead, they ignored Randolph’s refusal and gained access to his home 
by obtaining consent from his wife. These facts, I believe, were determinative for 
Justice Kennedy, and explain his vote in Randolph, notwithstanding his previous 
decision to join the Rodriguez majority. To be sure, Justice Kennedy does not 
provide any evidence in the form of a concurring opinion to support my thesis, 
and his questions during oral argument in Randolph did not pursue this line of 
reasoning. Nevertheless, the tone and logic of his questions during the oral 
arguments in Drayton and his opinion in that case, which emphasized that “It 
reinforces the rule of law for the citizen to advise the police of his or her wishes 
and for the police to act in reliance on that understanding”322 both suggest that an 
individual’s assertion of his rights is extremely important to Justice Kennedy’s 
 
319. A close reading of Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Randolph and the content of his questions 
during oral argument suggest that his vote for Randolph was, at best, a cautious one, and that he could have 
been persuaded to join the conservative Justices to vote for the state. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 125 (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“If Fourth Amendment law forced us to choose between two bright-line rules, (1) a rule that 
always found one tenant’s consent sufficient to justify a search without a warrant and (2) a rule that never did, I 
believe we should choose the first. That is because, as THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S dissent points out, a rule 
permitting such searches can serve important law enforcement needs (for example, in domestic abuse cases), 
and the consenting party’s joint tenancy diminishes the objecting party’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”); 
see also id. at 126 (“I stress the totality of the circumstances, however, because, were the circumstances to 
change significantly, so should the result. The Court’s opinion does not apply where the objector is not present 
‘and object[ing].’”). 
320. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (No. 01-631) (emphasis 
added). 
321. Id. at 44 (emphasis added). 
322. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 207. 
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conception of the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protection regarding consent 
searches. Otherwise, Justice Kennedy’s vote in Randolph is difficult to reconcile 
with his vote in Rodriguez. 
VI. RANDOLPH’S IMPACT ON FUTURE CONSENT CASES 
Section I of this article began by suggesting that Randolph might signal an 
important change in the Court’s consent search doctrine. The new approach that 
Randolph may initiate, however, is unlikely to be instigated by Justice Souter’s 
adoption of the social expectations test. Rather, any change in the law of consent 
searches prompted by Randolph is likely to reflect Justice Kennedy’s concerns 
about citizens asserting their Fourth Amendment rights and police respecting 
those assertions. But before describing how Justice Kennedy’s concerns can be 
applied to future cases, I need to explain why my proposal is so modest 
notwithstanding all of the troublesome aspects of consent searches described in 
this article. 
First, there are strong arguments supporting banning consent searches 
completely. Professor Marcy Strauss has taken this position, and I concur with 
her conclusions that, generally speaking, consent searches are not an effective 
law enforcement technique and that most consent searches are corrosive of 
Fourth Amendment rights.323 I also agree with the judgment of Professor Christo 
Lassiter that the notion of motorists voluntarily consenting to searches of their 
vehicles after being subject to police interrogation during a traffic stop is a legal 
fiction that ought to be eliminated.324 Strategically speaking, however, the current 
Court will never ban consent searches. Thus, although I agree with many of 
Professor Strauss’ and Professor Lassiter’s conclusions, their proposals to ban 
consent searches are not—at this point in time—a strategic solution to the 
problems associated with consent searches. 
Second, requiring warnings and a statement that police will respect and 
comply with a person’s refusal to allow a consent search would help alleviate 
some of the coercive aspects of consent searches. But, as with an outright ban, 
the current Court will not interpret the Fourth Amendment to require warnings no 
matter what empirical evidence reveals about an individual’s perceptions and 
ability to assert his rights during police-citizen encounters. When I refer to 
empirical evidence, I have in mind the data on consent searches presented in Illya 
 
323. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 258-72. 
324. See Lassiter, supra note 5. I also agree with Professor George Thomas’ observations that the 
Court’s consent search doctrine “is an acid that has eaten away the Fourth Amendment,” Thomas, supra note 8, 
at 541, and that it is “coherent, if not inevitable, to conclude that searches produced largely by acquiescence to 
police authority are simply not reasonable searches.” Id. at 549. Accordingly, Professor Thomas has proposed 
that “outside the context of public safety requests for consent, the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted so 
that a search based solely on consent is not a reasonable search. In effect, . . . consent should be ignored as a 
basis for a search except when it protects the public safety.” Id. at 557. 
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Licentenberg’s dissertation.325 For example, his empirical research revealed that 
motorists in Ohio consent to searches of their automobiles during traffic stops 
“for one primary reason: fear of reprisal if they refused.”326 His data also revealed 
that motorists were “unaware of their legal right to refuse,”327 believed that 
“refusals [to allow searches] are futile,”328 “fear[ed] police reprisal or added 
inconvenience from a refusal,”329 and “[a]lmost none of the subjects [surveyed] 
felt that the officer would honor their decision to refuse.”330 In other words, most 
motorists believed that “the search [would] be conducted with or without their 
consent.”331 
Instead of banning consent searches or calling for Miranda-like warnings, 
both of which would be beneficial, my suggestion is a more modest proposal that 
is consistent with Justice Kennedy’s tacit concerns in Randolph and Drayton. 
Under current Fourth Amendment law, if a person is asked by the police to 
provide consent, but refuses, the voluntariness test of Bustamonte does not 
prevent the police from continuing to seek consent.332 To be sure, an earlier 
refusal is a factor that is sometimes considered by the courts,333 but it does not 
trigger a per se rule against continued requests for consent. Similarly, a person’s 
subsequent refusal to sign a consent form does not operate to make a prior oral 
consent invalid.334 More importantly, many courts have upheld consent searches 
in contexts where a person initially refuses and the police then indicate that they 
will obtain a warrant to authorize a search or explain that other types of police 
procedures will ensue—such as arresting or detaining the person because of his 
refusal.335 Put differently, existing law on consent searches “does not preclude 
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the police from trying to ‘persuade’ the suspect to consent.”336 Not only are the 
police not required to take “no” as the final answer, but current law “does not 
preclude the police from ‘wearing down’ the suspect to obtain consent.”337 
I propose that whenever a person objects or refuses to provide consent, as 
Randolph did, that refusal should bar further attempts by the police to seek 
consent. Furthermore, a refusal to sign a written consent form should also operate 
retroactively to invalidate an earlier oral consent. If the person says no or refuses 
to sign a written consent form, then, as a matter of Fourth Amendment law, 
police should be barred from continuing to seek permission to search or 
explaining that alternative police procedures will ensue as result of the person’s 
assertion of his rights.338 In other words, my proposal is similar to the rule that 
already applies in the police interrogation context under Miranda and its 
progeny. Whenever a suspect asks to speak with a lawyer, under Edwards v. 
Arizona, the police are barred from further questioning until counsel has been 
provided unless the suspect initiates a desire to discuss the investigation.339 The 
per se rule announced in Edwards was designed to end police badgering, provide 
guidance to the police, and, most importantly, help suspects who feel 
uncomfortable dealing with police interrogation by themselves. 
A similar per se rule for persons who refuse to allow a consent search would 
also discourage police badgering of persons, provide guidance to lower courts 
and police officers who must apply and comply with Bustamonte’s open-ended 
voluntariness test or the reasonableness rule announced in Drayton, and, most 
importantly, protect the Fourth Amendment rights of persons who are 
uncomfortable dealing with police-citizen encounters and who believe that police 
officers will not honor their refusal to allow consent searches. As a practical 
matter, this proposal is also consistent with the legal theory that appears to be 
motivating Justice Kennedy’s thinking on consent searches, namely that people 
should know their rights and assert them if they do not want police invading their 
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privacy. Thus, if a motorist refuses to allow a consent search during a traffic stop, 
that objection should end the matter, just as Randolph’s refusal was the 
determining factor in his case. The police should not be allowed to continue 
seeking consent, or tell the motorist that a drug-sniffing canine will be brought to 
the scene, or that his or her car will be impounded, or that the police will seek a 
search warrant. These tactics are designed to undermine the person’s initial 
assertion of his rights. Put succinctly, knowing and asserting your rights should 
have real and important legal consequences, just as it did in Randolph. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When Bustamonte was decided, Justice Marshall complained that the Court 
had approved “a game of blindman’s buff [sic], in which the police always have 
the upper hand, for the sake of nothing more than the convenience of the 
police.”340 Justice Marshall’s concerns were validated when a police detective 
explained to researchers how obtaining a person’s consent to search simply 
involved making an offer that could not be refused: 
[You] tell the guy, “Let me come in and take a look at your house.” And 
he says, “No, I don’t want to.” And then you tell him, “Then, I’m going 
to leave Sam here, and he’s going to live with you until we come back 
[with a search warrant.] Now we can do it either way.” And very rarely 
do the people say, “Go get your search warrant, then.”341 
This anecdote nicely captures how consent occurs in the real world. It also 
exposes the fictional quality of the Court’s consent search doctrine. Perhaps 
Randolph signals a change in the law. Undoubtedly, Randolph and Drayton make 
plain that if people do not want their homes, persons, or belongings searched, 
they must stand up against the police and assert their rights. I would take these 
cases one step further: When a person asserts his or her rights and says “no” to 
the police, the game should be over and police should not be permitted to bluff or 
coax consent from a person. That is the essence of Justice Kennedy’s opinion in 
Drayton and that view explains his vote in Randolph. 
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